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OPTIMALITY OF INDEPENDENTLY RANDOMIZED SYMMETRIC POLICIES
FOR EXCHANGEABLE STOCHASTIC TEAMS WITH INFINITELY MANY
DECISION MAKERS ∗
SINA SANJARI, NACI SALDI AND SERDAR YU¨KSEL
Abstract. We study stochastic team (known also as decentralized stochastic control or identical interest stochas-
tic dynamic game) problems with large or countably infinite number of decision makers, and characterize existence
and structural properties for (globally) optimal policies. We consider both static and dynamic non-convex team prob-
lems where the cost function and dynamics satisfy an exchangeability condition. We first establish a de Finetti type
representation theorem for exchangeable decentralized policies, that is, for the probability measures induced by ad-
missible relaxed control policies under decentralized information structures. This leads to a representation theorem
for policies which admit an infinite exchangeability condition. For a general setup of stochastic team problems with
N decision makers, under exchangeability of observations of decision makers and the cost function, we show that
without loss of global optimality, the search for optimal policies can be restricted to those that are N -exchangeable.
Then, by extending N -exchangeable policies to infinitely exchangeable ones, establishing a convergence argument
for the induced costs, and using the presented de Finetti type theorem, we establish the existence of an optimal de-
centralized policy for static and dynamic teams with countably infinite number of decision makers, which turns out to
be symmetric (i.e., identical) and randomized. In particular, unlike prior work, convexity of the cost is not assumed.
Finally, we show near optimality of symmetric independently randomized policies for finiteN -decision maker team
problems and thus establish approximation results for N -decision maker weakly coupled stochastic teams.
Key words. Stochastic teams, mean-field theory, decentralized stochastic control, exchangeable processes.
1. Introduction. Stochastic team problems consist of a collection of decision makers
or agents acting together to optimize a common cost function, but not necessarily sharing all
the available information. At each time stage, each decision maker only has partial access to
the global information which is defined by the information structure (IS) of the problem [58].
When there is a pre-defined order according to which the decision makers act then the team is
called a sequential team. For sequential teams, if each agent’s information depends only on
primitive random variables, the team is static. If at least one agent’s information is affected
by an action of another agent, the team is said to be dynamic.
In this paper, we study stochastic team problems with a large but finite and countably
infinite number of decision makers. We characterize existence and structural properties of
(globally) optimal policies in such problems. While teams can be at first sight viewed as
a narrow class of (identical interest) stochastic dynamic games, when viewed as a gener-
alization of classical single decision maker (DM) stochastic control, they are quite general
with increasingly common applications involving many areas of applied mathematics such
as decentralized stochastic control, networked control, communication networks, cooperative
systems, and energy, or more generally, smart grid design.
Connections to convex stochastic teams. For teams with finitely many decision mak-
ers, Marschak [47] studied static teams and Radner [50] established connections between
person-by-person optimality, stationarity, and team-optimality. Radner’s results were gen-
eralized in [39] by relaxing optimality conditions. A summary of these results is that in the
context of static team problems, the convexity of the cost function, subject to minor regularity
conditions, suffices for the global optimality of person-by-person-optimal solutions. In the
particular case for LQG (Linear Quadratic Gaussian) static teams, this result leads to the op-
timality of linear policies [50], which also applies to dynamic LQG problems under partially
nested information structures [33]. These results are applicable to static teams with finite
number of decision makers.
In our paper, the main focus is on teams with infinitely many decision makers. In this
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direction, we note that in our prior works [54, 53], we studied static and dynamic teams
where under convexity and symmetry conditions, global optimality of the limit points of the
sequence of N decision maker optimal policies was established. These works also provided
existence and structural results for convex static and dynamic teams with infinitely many
decision makers. We also note [46] where LQG static teams with countably infinite number
of decision makers have been studied and sufficient conditions for global optimality have
been established. In our paper here, convexity is not imposed.
Connections with the literature on mean-field games/teams. Team problems can
be considered as games with identical interests. For the case with infinitely many deci-
sion makers, a related set of results involves mean-field games: mean-field games (see e.g.,
[35, 34, 44]) can be viewed as limit models of symmetric non-zero-sum non-cooperative
finite player games with a mean-field interaction. We note that in team problems, person-by-
person optimality (Nash equilibrium in games) does not in general imply global optimality
both for N -decision maker teams and teams with countably infinite number of DMs. As we
have mentioned, for static teams, a sufficient condition is the convexity of the cost function,
subject to minor regularity conditions [39]. However, mean-field teams under decentralized
information structures generally correspond to dynamic team problems with non-classical
information structures (an observation of a decision maker i is affected by the action of a
decision maker j where decision maker i does not have access to the observation of decision
maker j) , hence, mean-field team problems may be non-convex even under the convexity of
the cost function due to the non-classical information structures (see [65, Section 3.3] and
the celebrated counterexample of Witsenhausen [59]). Hence, person-by-person optimality is
inconclusive for global optimality.
The existence of equilibrium has been established for mean-field games in [44, 7, 22, 45,
40]. Furthermore, person-by-person optimal solutions may perform arbitrary poorly. In [7],
examples have been provided to show the existence of multiple solutions to mean-field games
when uniqueness conditions in [44, 22] are violated. There have also been several studies for
mean-field games where the limits of sequences of Nash equilibria have been investigated as
the number of decision makers tends to infinity (see e.g., [29, 43, 8, 44, 5]). Social optima for
mean-field linear quadratic Gaussian control problems under both centralized and restricted
decentralized information structure have been considered in [36, 57]. We refer readers to
[21, 16] for a literature review and a detailed summary of some recent results on mean-field
games and social optima problems.
Some relevant studies on the existence and convergence of equilibria from the mean-field
games literature are the following: In [18], for one-shot mean-field games, under regularity
assumptions on the cost function, it has been shown that mixed Nash strategies of N -player
symmetric games converge through a subsequence to a limit (which is a weak-solution of the
mean-field limit). In [29], through a concentration of measures argument, it has been shown
that a subsequence of symmetric local approximate Nash equilibria forN player games con-
verge to a solution for the mean-field game under the assumption that the normalized occu-
pational measures converges weakly to a deterministic measure. Furthermore, using a similar
method in [41], assumptions on equilibrium policies of the large population mean-field sym-
metric stochastic differential games have been presented to allow the convergence of asym-
metric approximate Nash equilibria to a weak solution of the mean-field game [41, Theorem
2.6] in the presence of common randomness. Using martingale methods and relaxed controls
(see also [29, 41, 40, 22]), an existence result and a limit theory have been established for con-
trolled McKean-Vlasov dynamics [42]. We note that in [41, 42, 40, 22], it has been assumed
that each player has full access to the information available to all players, i.e., the controls
are functions of all initial states, Wiener processes of all players, and common randomness.
Thus, the information structure is centralized.
We further note that the existence results for equilibria have been established in
[41, 22, 21, 29] where strategies of each player are assumed to be progressively measurable
to the filtration generated by initial states and Wiener processes (also called open-loop con-
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trollers in the mean-field games’ literature [41, 22, 21, 29]). We note that in our setup under
these strategies the information structure corresponds to the static problems. The equilibria
with respect to closed-loop (in the team problem setup, with respect to dynamic information
structure) is completely different since the deviating player can still influence the information
of other players and hence it can influence the average of states or actions substantially.
Under a convexity condition (which has been introduced in [28] and also considered in
[42, 40]), and under the classical information structure (i.e., what would be a centralized
problem in the team theoretic setup), convergence of Nash equilibria induced by closed-loop
controllers (both path-dependent and Markovian) to a weak semi-Markov mean-field equi-
librium has been established in [43] for finite horizon mean-field game problems. Recently,
in [17], both a convergence result for all correlated equilibrium solutions of discrete finite
state mean-field games as limits of exchangeable correlated equilibria restricted to Markov
open-loop strategies and an approximation result for N -players correlated equilibria have
been established.
We also note a result in [19] for the convergence of the closed-loop equilibria, where an
infinite-dimensional PDE, the master equation, has been considered and its smooth solution
has been used to show the convergence of the empirical measure to a mean-field game equi-
librium. We note that, the approach requires uniqueness of the mean-field equilibrium [19].
For infinite horizon problems, in [20], an example of ergodic differential games with mean-
field coupling has been constructed such that limits of sequences of expected costs induced
by symmetric Nash-equilibrium of N -player games capture expected costs induced by many
more Nash-equilibruim policies including a mean-field equilibrium and social optima. In
[43], the classical information structure (a centralized problem) has been considered, where
in [20] it has been assumed that players have access to all the history of states of all play-
ers but not controls (we note that in the team problem setup with the classical information
structure through using a classical result of Blackwell [9] in the case where each decision
maker knows all the history of states of all decision makers, optimal policies can be realized
as one in the centralized problem where just the global state is a sufficient statistic). As we
see, information structure aspects lead to subtle differences in analysis and conclusions.
Furthermore, in the context of stochastic teams with countably infinite number of deci-
sion makers, the gap between person by person optimality (Nash equilibrium in the game-
theoretic context) and global team optimality is significant since a perturbation of finitely
many policies fails to deviate the value of the expected cost, thus person by person opti-
mality is a weak condition for such a setup. Hence, without establishing the uniqueness of
the mean-field solution (which may hold under strong monotonicity assumptions [44]), the
results presented in the aforementioned papers may be inconclusive regarding global opti-
mality of the limit equilibrium (for non-uniqueness results, see [7, 26, 20]). For teams and
social optima control problems, the analysis has primarily focused on the LQG model where
the centralized performance has been shown to be achieved asymptotically by decentralized
controllers (see e.g., [36, 3, 4]).
In this paper, we will adopt a different and novel approach. First, under symmetry of
information structures and cost functions, we show that optimal policies are of an exchange-
able type for both teams with finite and countably infinite number of decision makers. Then,
we will develop a de Finetti type representation theorem that characterizes the set of optimal
policies as the extreme points of a convex set.
Connections with existence results on decentralized stochastic control and the ge-
ometry of information structures. We also note that compared to the results on the existence
of a globally optimal policy in team problemswhere (finite)N -decision maker team problems
has been considered [63, 30, 65, 52], we study static team problems with countably infinite
number of decision makers.
In our approach, we use randomized policies for our analysis and we define a topology
on control policies for decentralized stochastic control. A consequence of our analysis is
that, in the limit of countably infinitely many decision makers, one can characterize the set
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of optimal policies as the extreme points of a convex set of policies, which is, in turn, a
subset of decentralized, independently randomized and identical policies. Such a result is
not applicable to teams with finitely many decision makers. This geometric representation
of the set of policies is related to the celebrated de Finetti’s theorem. De Finetti’s theorem
implies that infinitely exchangeable joint probability measures can be represented as mixtures
(convex combination) of identical and independent probability measures [1, 32, 38].
There has been related work in the quantum information/mechanics literature. Let us
first note, however, that in [27], it has been shown that finite number of exchangeable prob-
ability measures can be approximated by a mixture of identical and independent probability
measures, and this approximation asymptotically becomesmore accurate when the number of
exchangeable random variables increases. The de Finetti representation type results have been
extended for quantum systems where conditional probability measures have been considered
[14, 51, 25, 6, 23]. In fact, for permutation-symmetric conditional probability measures, ap-
proximation results have been obtained, provided that the non-signaling property holds (a
conditional independence propety between local actions and other measurements given local
measurement) [14, 51, 25, 6, 23]. We refer readers to [15, 49], for a review on the connection
between the non-signaling conditional probability measures and the conditional probability
measures with private and common randomness.
We note that, de Finetti type results developed for conditional probability measures in
quantum information literature give us a geometric interpretation we require for strategic
measures (a geometric connection between non-signaling infinitely exchangeable conditional
probability measures and conditional probability measures induced by common and private
randomness). However, in the team problem setup, in addition to show this geometric connec-
tion, one is require to show that the common randomness is independent of the observations.
We address this issue by establishing a de Finetti type representation theorem on space of
policies, properly defined and metrized.
Contributions. In view of the above, this paper makes the following contributions.
(i) Under symmetry of information structures and exchangeability of the cost function,
we first consider teams with N DMs (N -DM teams) and establish the optimality of
N -exchangeable randomized policies.
(ii) We establish a de Finetti type representation theorem for decentralized relaxed poli-
cies, that is, for the probability measures induced by admissible policies under de-
centralized information structures. This leads to a representation theorem for decen-
tralized relaxed policies which admit an infinite exchangeability condition.
(iii) By extendingN -exchangeable policies to infinitely exchangeable ones, establishing
a convergence argument for the induced costs, and using the presented de Finetti the-
orem for decentralized relaxed policies, we establish the structure, and also the exis-
tence of an optimal decentralized policy for static and dynamic teams with countably
infinite number of decision makers, which turns out to be symmetric (i.e., identical)
and randomized. Compared to our previous results for static and dynamic mean-
field teams in [54, Theorem 12 or Proposition 1] and [53, Theorem 3.4]: i) the cost
function is not necessarily convex in actions ii) action spaces are not necessarily
convex iii) the mean-field coupling is considered in dynamics, which leads to a non-
classical information structure (a consequence being that the problem is in general
non-convex in policies).
(iv) ForN -decision maker symmetric teams with a symmetric information structure, we
show that symmetric (identical) randomized policies of mean-field teams are nearly
optimal.
2. Preliminaries and statement of main results.
2.1. Preliminaries. In this section, we introduce Witsenhausen’s Intrinsic Model for
sequential teams [58] (we generalize this definition to infinite number of decision makers).
• There exists a collection of measurable spaces {(Ω,F), (Ui,U i), (Yi,Yi), i ∈ N},
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specifying the system’s distinguishable events, and control and measurement spaces.
The set N denotes the collection of decision makers. The set N can be a finite set
{1, 2, . . . , N} or a countable set N. The pair (Ω,F) is a measurable space (on which
an underlying probabilitymay be defined). The pair (Ui,U i) denotes the Borel space
from which the action ui of DMi is selected. The pair (Yi,Yi) denotes the Borel
observation/measurement space.
• There is a measurement constraint to establish the connection between the observa-
tion variables and the system’s distinguishable events. The Yi-valued observation
variables are given by yi = hi(ω, u[1,i−1]), where u[1,i−1] = {uk, k ≤ i − 1} and
his are measurable functions.
• The set of admissible control laws γ = {γi}i∈N , also called designs or policies,
are measurable control functions, so that ui = γi(yi). Let Γi denote the set of all
admissible policies for DMi and let Γ =
∏
i∈N Γ
i.
• There is a probability measure P on (Ω,F) describing the probability space on
which the system is defined.
Under this intrinsic model, a sequential team problem is dynamic if the information avail-
able to at least one decision maker (DM) is affected by the action of at least one other DM.
A team problem is static, if for every decision maker the information available is only af-
fected by exogenous disturbances; that is no other decision maker can affect the information
at any given decision maker. Information structures can also be categorized as classical,
quasi-classical or non-classical. An Information Structure (IS) {yi, i ∈ N} is classical if yi
contains all of the information available to DMk for k < i. An IS is quasi-classical or par-
tially nested, if whenever uk, for some k < i, affects yi through the measurement function hi,
yi contains yk (that is σ(yk) ⊂ σ(yi)). An IS which is not partially nested is non-classical.
In the paper, we will also allow for randomized policies, where in addition to yi, each
decision maker DMi has access to, without any loss, a [0, 1]-valued independent random
variable. This will be made precise later in the paper.
2.2. Problem statement. We consider stochastic team problems with finite but large as
well as countably infinite number of DMs. We address three main problems: (i) existence
and structural results for static teams with countably infinite number of DMs (Section 4) (ii)
existence and structural results for dynamic teams with countably infinite number of DMs
(Section 5) (iii) approximation results for N -DM static and dynamic teams (Section 6).
Let the action space and observation space be identical through DMs Ui = U ⊆ Rn and
Yi = Y ⊆ Rm for all i ∈ N, where n andm are positive integers.
Problem (PN ): Let N = {1, . . . , N}. Let γN = (γ
1, · · · , γN ) and ΓN =
∏N
i=1 Γ
i.
Define an expected cost function of γ
N
as
(2.1) JN (γN ) = E
γ
N [c(ω0, uN )] := E[c(ω0, γ
1(y1), · · · , γN(yN ))],
for some Borel measurable cost function c : Ω0 ×
∏N
k=1 U
k → R+. We define ω0 as the
Ω0-valued cost function relevant exogenous random variable as ω0 : (Ω,F ,P) → (Ω0,F0),
where Ω0 is a Borel space with its Borel σ-field F0. Here, we have the notation uN :=
{ui, i ∈ N}.
DEFINITION 2.1. For a given stochastic team problem (PN ) with a given information
structure, a policy (strategy) γ∗
N
:= (γ1
∗
, . . . , γN
∗
) ∈ ΓN is optimal for (PN ) if
JN (γ
∗
N
) = inf
γ
N
∈ΓN
JN (γN ) =: J
∗
N .
Problem (P∞): Consider a stochastic team with countably infinite number of decision
makers, that is,N = N. Let Γ =
∏
i∈N Γ
i and γ = (γ1, γ2, . . . ). Let c : Ω0×U×U → R+.
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Define the expected cost of γ as
(2.2) J(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
1
N
E
γ
[ N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up
)]
.
With slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation for the cost function c as in (2.1).
DEFINITION 2.2. For a given stochastic team problem (P∞) with a given information
structure, a policy γ∗ := (γ1∗, γ2∗, . . .) ∈ Γ is optimal for (P∞) if
J(γ∗) = inf
γ∈Γ
J(γ) =: J∗.
Our first goal here is to establish the existence of a symmetric (identical) randomized
global optimal policy for static mean-field team problems (P∞). To this end, we first estab-
lish N -exchangeablity of randomized optimal policies for (PN ) and symmetry for optimal
randomized policies of (P∞). Then using symmetry, we establish an existence result for
(P∞). Our second goal here is to establish the existence of a symmetric (identical) random-
ized global optimal policy for mean-field dynamic team problems where DMs are weakly
coupled through the average of states and actions in dynamics and/or the cost function. De-
fine state dynamics and observation dynamics of decision makers as follows:
xit+1 = ft
(
xit, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t , w
i
t
)
,(2.3)
yit = ht
(
xi0:t, u
i
0:t−1, v
i
0:t
)
,(2.4)
where functions ft and ht are measurable functions and v
i
t and w
i
t are exogenous ran-
dom vectors in the standard Borel space. We denote xi0:t := (x
i
0, . . . , x
i
t), u
i
0:t−1 :=
(ui0, . . . , u
i
t−1), and v
i
0:t := (v
i
0, . . . , v
i
t). Let the information structure of DM
i at time t
be Iit = {y
i
t}.
Problem (PNT ): Consider N -DM mean-field dynamic teams with the expected cost
function of γ1:N as
JNT (γ
1:N ) =
1
N
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
E
γ1:N
[
c
(
ω0, x
i
t, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t
)]
,(2.5)
where γ1:N = (γ10:T−1, . . . , γ
N
0:T−1) and γ
i
0:T−1 = (γ
i
0, . . . , γ
i
T−1).
Problem (P∞T ): Consider mean-field dynamic teams with the expected cost function of
γ as
J∞T (γ) = lim sup
N→∞
JNT (γ
1:N ),(2.6)
where γ = (γ10:T−1, γ
2
0:T−1, . . . ) and γ
1:N = (γ10:T−1, . . . , γ
N
0:T−1).
Analogous to Definition 2.1 and Definition 2.2, we can define global optimal policies for
(PNT ) and (P
∞
T ). In Section 5, we establish the existence of a symmetric (identical through
DMs) randomized global optimal policy for (P∞T ). Similar to the static case, we first estab-
lish N -exchangeablity of randomized optimal policies for (PNT ) and symmetry for optimal
randomized policies of (P∞T ). Then using symmetry, we establish an existence result for
(P∞T ).
Finally, we address the following problem in Section 6. If P ∗π is a (randomized) symmet-
ric optimal policy for (P∞) ((P∞T )) then there exist ǫN ≥ 0 with ǫN → 0 as N → ∞ such
that P ∗π |N is ǫN -optimal for (P
N ) ((PNT )) where P
∗
π |N is the restriction of P
∗
π to the first N
decision makers to do that. We use our symmetry results and analysis for (P∞) ((P∞T )).
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2.3. Discussion of main results. In mean-field team problems, one can be interested in
the existence and structure of global optimal policies. In particular, one can ask if there is a
globally optimal policy and whether this optimal policy is symmetric (by a symmetric policy
we mean that a policy is identical through DMs) for these type of problems. One may be also
interested in the connection between optimal policies for mean-field teams and approximation
of the optimal policies for the pre-limit N -DM teams when N is large. The purpose of this
paper is to address these questions for mean-field team problems where the problem can be
non-convex. The non-convexity of the problem can arise as a result of non-convexity of the
action space and/or non-convexity of the cost function in actions. Also, even if the action
space is convex and the cost function is convex in actions, the information structure of the
problem may lead to non-convexity of the problem in policies (see for example [65, Section
3.3]). A celebrated example is the counterexample of Witsenhausen [59].
In Lemma 4.1 for static N -DM teams and in Lemma 5.2 for dynamicN -DM teams, we
first show that the optimal policies are of N -exchangeable type. Then, in Lemma 4.2 for
static mean-field teams and in Lemma 5.3 for dynamic mean-field teams, we show the global
optimality of infinitely-exchangeable optimal policies and we use de Finetti representation to
establish symmetry of optimal policies. We establish the existence of a symmetric random-
ized optimal policy for static and dynamicmean-field teams in Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 5.4,
respectively. In Section 6, based on our analysis for the existence and symmetry of optimal
policy for mean-field teams, we establish approximation results for N -DM weakly coupled
teams.
One of the main difficulties in studying non-convexmean-field team problems is to show
that global optimal policies for mean-field team problems are symmetric (identical for each
DM). This difficulty stems from the observation that, in general, global optimal policies are
not symmetric for non-convexpre-limitN -DM team problems (which can be seen in Example
1). This is in contrast to the convex mean-field teams where symmetry can be established for
both pre-limitN -DM and mean-field team problems [54, 53]. In our approach:
(i) We first establish a de Finetti representation result for probability measures on poli-
cies. In Theorem 3.2, we show that any infinitely exchangeable probability mea-
sures on policies can be represented by elements of the set of probability measures
on policies with common independent randomness where conditioned on common
randomness, randomization of the policies are independent and identical through
DMs.
(ii) In Section 4 for static and Section 5 for dynamic N -DM stochastic teams (see
Lemma 4.1 and Lemma 5.2), we show that by exchangeablity of the cost function
and considering symmetric information structures (under a causality condition for
the dynamic case), one can establish N -exchangeability of optimal policies.
(iii) In Section 4 for static and Section 5 for dynamic mean-field teams (see Lemma
4.2 and Lemma 5.3) under regularity conditions on the cost function and dynamics,
by constructing infinitely exchangeable policies by relabeling N -exchangeable op-
timal policies, asN goes to infinity, we show the asymptotic optimality of infinitely
exchangeable optimal policies. Hence, this, following from our de Finneti type the-
orem (see Theorem 3.2), establishes asymptotic global optimality of symmetric and
conditionally independent policies.
(iv) Using extreme point and lower semi-continuity arguments, we establish the exis-
tence of a symmetric optimal policy (which is privately randomized) for static and
dynamic mean-field teams (see Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 5.4).
(v) In Section 6, using our analysis for mean-field problems, as N goes to infinity, we
show that symmetric optimal policies of mean-field teams are asymptotically opti-
mal for N -DM weakly coupled teams, hence, it establishes approximation results
for this class of problems.
In the following, we first study static teams, then we study dynamic teams where the
analysis is similar to the static case but is more technical.
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3. Topology on control policies and a de Finetti representation result.
3.1. Topology on control policies. In this section, we define topology on control poli-
cies and then using this topology, we introduce Borel probability measures on policies. We
first considerN -DM static team problems.
ASSUMPTION 3.1. Assume for any DMi, there exists a probability measure Qi on Yi
and a function f i such that for all Borel sets S = S1 × · · · × SN , we have
P((y1, . . . , yN) ∈ S
∣∣ω0) =
N∏
i=1
∫
Si
f i(yi, ω0, y
1, . . . , yi−1)Qi(dyi).(3.1)
Following from [63, 60], Assumption 3.1 allows us to reduce the problem as a static team
problem where the observation of each DM is independent of observations of other DMs and
also independent of ω0. Hence, under Assumption 3.1, we can focus on each DM
i separately
and identify Γi via the set of probability measures
Θi :=
{
P ∈ P(Ui × Yi)
∣∣∣∣P (dui, dyi) = 1{γi(yi)∈dui}Qi(dyi), γi ∈ Γi
}
,
where P(·) denotes the space of probability measures, 1A(·) denotes the indicator function
of the set A. The above set is the set of extreme points of the set of probability measures on
(Ui×Yi)with fixedmarginalsQi on Yi. Hence it inherits Borel measurability and topological
properties of that Borel measurable set [11]. We define convergence on policies as γin → γ
i
iff 1{γin(yi)∈dui}Q
i(dyi) → 1{γi(yi)∈dui}Q
i(dyi) (in the weak convergence topology) as
n→∞ for each DM. It is worth noting that this is also related to Young measures in control
theory [61].
As noted earlier, we will also allow for randomized (relaxed) policies. Accordingly, each
individual control policy γi ∈ Γi is an element in the set of probability measures P(Ui×Yi)
with a fixed marginal,Qi, on Yi.
REMARK 1. In particular, if yi takes values from a countable set, Assumption 3.1 al-
ways holds since we can find a reference measure Qi(dyi) =
∑
i≥1 2
−iδyi(mi) where
Yi = {mi, i ∈ N}. In this case, one can define topology by the convergence defined as
γin → γ
i iff γin(y
i)→ γi(yi) as n→∞ for every realization of yi ∈ Yi.
Now that we have a standard Borel space formulation for policies, we can define the set of
probability measures on policies with product topology on ΓN =
∏N
i=1 Γ
i. We define the
following set of Borel probability measures on admissible relaxed policies ΓN as follows:
LN := P(ΓN),(3.2)
where Borel σ-field B(Γi) is induced by the topology defined above.
We recall the definition of exchangeability for random variables.
DEFINITION 3.1. Random variables x1, x2, . . . , xN defined on a common probability
space are N -exchangeable if for any permutation σ of the set {1, . . . , N},
P
(
xσ(1) ∈ A1, xσ(2) ∈ A2, . . . , xσ(N) ∈ AN
)
= P
(
x1 ∈ A1, x2 ∈ A2, . . . , xN ∈ AN
)
for any measurable {A1, . . . , AN}, and (x1, x2, . . . ) is infinitely-exchangeable if it is N -
exchangeable for all N ∈ N.
Now, we define the set of exchangeable probability measures on policies as:
LNEX :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
N
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) and for all σ ∈ SN :
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Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ
N ∈ AN ) = Pπ(γ
σ(1) ∈ A1, . . . , γ
σ(N) ∈ AN )
}
,
where SN is the space of permutations of {1, . . . , N}. We note that LNEX is a convex subset
of LN . Define the set of probability measures on policies induced by a common randomness
as:
LNCO :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
N
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) :
Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ
N ∈ AN ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
N∏
i=1
P iπ(γ
i ∈ Ai|z)η(dz), η ∈ P([0, 1])
}
,
where η is the distribution of common, but independent (from intrinsic exogenous system
variables), randomness. Note that conditioned on z, policies are independent. We also define
the set LNCO,SYM as the set of identical probability measures on policies induced by a common
randomness:
LNCO,SYM :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
N
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) :
Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ
N ∈ AN ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
N∏
i=1
Pπ(γ
i ∈ Ai|z)η(dz), η ∈ P([0, 1])
}
,
where we drop the index i in Pπ to indicate that the independent randomization is identical
through DMs. Also, define the set of probability measures on policies with only private
independent randomness as:
LNPR :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
N
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) : Pπ(γ1 ∈ A1, . . . , γN ∈ AN ) =
N∏
i=1
P iπ(γ
i ∈ Ai)
}
.
Finally, define the set of probability measures on policies with identical and independent
randomness:
LNPR,SYM :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
N
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) : Pπ(γ1 ∈ A1, . . . , γN ∈ AN ) =
N∏
i=1
Pπ(γ
i ∈ Ai)
}
.
For a team with countably infinite number of decision makers, we define sets of proba-
bility measuresL,LEX, LCO, LCO,SYM, LPR, LPR,SYM similarly using Ionescu Tulcea extension
theorem through the sequential formulation reviewed in Section 2.1, by iteratively adding new
coordinates for our probability measure (see e.g., [2, 31]). We define the set of probability
measures L on the infinite product Borel spaces Γ =
∏
i∈N Γ
i as:
L := P(Γ).(3.3)
Now, we define the set of infinitely exchangeable probability measures on policies as:
LEX :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) and for all N ∈ N, and for all σ ∈ SN :
Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ
N ∈ AN ) = Pπ(γ
σ(1) ∈ A1, . . . , γ
σ(N) ∈ AN )
}
,
and we define
LCO :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) :
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Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, γ
2 ∈ A2, . . . ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
∏
i∈N
P iπ(γ
i ∈ Ai|z)η(dz), η ∈ P([0, 1])
}
.
Note that LCO is a convex subset of L and its extreme points are in the set of probability
measures on policies with private independent randomness:
LPR :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) : Pπ(γ1 ∈ A1, γ2 ∈ A2, . . . ) =
∏
i∈N
P iπ(γ
i ∈ Ai)
}
.
Also, we define
LCO,SYM :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) :
Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, γ
2 ∈ A2, . . . ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
∏
i∈N
Pπ(γ
i ∈ Ai|z)η(dz), η ∈ P([0, 1])
}
,
and we define
LPR,SYM :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) : Pπ(γ1 ∈ A1, γ2 ∈ A2, . . . ) =
∏
i∈N
Pπ(γ
i ∈ Ai)
}
.
3.2. A de Finetti theorem for admissible team policies. In the following, based on the
classical de Finetti’s theorem, we show the connection between LEX and LCO, SYM; that is,
infinitely-exchangeable policies is a mixture of i.i.d. policies.
THEOREM 3.2. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then, any Pπ ∈ LEX satisfying the
following condition:
(Moment condition): for every i ∈ N, E(φi(u
i)) ≤ K for some finite K , where φi :
Ui → R+ is a lower semi-continuous moment function.
is in LCO,SYM, i.e., for any Pπ ∈ LEX satisfying the above moment condition, there exists a
random variable z ∈ [0, 1] such that for any Ai ∈ B(Γ
i)
Pπ(γ
1 ∈ A1, γ
2 ∈ A2, . . . ) =
∫
z∈[0,1]
∏
i∈N
Pπ(γ
i ∈ Ai|z)η(dz), η ∈ P([0, 1]).
Proof. We first show that the set of elements of LEX satisfying the moment condition is
tight. By Assumption 3.1, for each DM, we can represent policies as probability measures on
(Ui×Yi)with fixed marginals on observations. Since the team is now static with independent
observations, this decouples the policy spaces. Following from the hypothesis on φi and the
fact that ν →
∫
ν(dx)g(x) is weakly lower semi-continuous for a continuous function g
[63, proof of Theorem 4.7], the marginals of probability measures on Ui induced by policies
with moment condition is tight. If the set of marginals is tight, then the collection of all
measures with these tight marginals is also tight (see e.g., [62, Proof of Theorem 2.4]) and
hence the control policy space is tight. This implies that elements of LEX satisfying the
moment condition is tight.
Let Pπ be the limit in the weak-convergence topology of the sequence of probability
measures {Pnπ }n ⊂ LEX. Hence, P
σ
π is the limit in the weak-convergence topology of the
sequence of probability measures {P σ,nπ }n as n → ∞, where for A
i ∈ B(Γi) and for all
N ∈ N and all finite permutations σ ∈ SN
P σ,nπ (γ
1 ∈ A1, γ2 ∈ A2, . . . ) := Pnπ (γ
σ(1) ∈ A1, γσ(2) ∈ A2, . . . ).
Following from exchangeability, both sequences are identical and hence, the limit in the weak
convergence topology of both sequences are identical and this implies thatLEX is closed under
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the weak convergence topology. Hence, elements of LEX satisfying the moment condition is
compact under the weak convergence topology.
By the classical de Finetti’s theorem (see for example [1]), any infinitely exchangeable
probability measures Pπ ∈ LEX is a mixture of identical individually randomized policies,
that is, Pπ ∈ LCO,SYM (This can also be viewed as an application of Choquet’s theorem [48],
that is, for any elements Pπ in convex and compact subset LEX of a locally convex space L,
there exist a probability measure η on LEX which is supported by the extreme points of LEX
and which represents Pπ as a mixture of the extreme points).
4. Existence and structure of optimal policies for symmetric static team problems
with infinitely many decision makers. In this section, we consider static stochastic team
problems. We note that all the proofs regarding this section are presented in Appendix A.
Based on the definitions of probability measures on control policies, we redefine the expected
cost in (PN ) of a randomized policy Pπ ∈ LN as:
JπN (γN ) :=
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
:=
∫
c(ω0, γ
1(y1), . . . , γN(yN ))Pπ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (dy1, . . . , dyN |ω0)P(dω0),(4.1)
where cN (γ, y, ω0) := c(ω0, γ
1(y1), . . . , γN (yN )) and µN is the conditional distribution
of measurements given ω0. . In the following, we characterize team problems in which
the search for an optimal policy can be restricted to policies in LNEX without losing global
optimality.
ASSUMPTION 4.1. The cost function is exchangeable with respect to actions for all ω0,
i.e., for any permutation σ of {1, . . . , N} c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN) = c(ω0, u
σ(1), . . . , uσ(N)) for
all ω0.
LEMMA 4.1. For a fixedN , consider anN -DM static team. Assume L¯N is an arbitrary
convex subset of LN . Under Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 4.1, if observations of DMs are
exchangeable conditioned on ω0, then
(4.2)
inf
Ppi∈L¯N
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) = inf
Ppi∈L¯N∩LNEX
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
In the following, we present an existence result on globally optimal policies for static
mean-field teams with infinitely many decision makers. First, we re-state the infinite decision
maker mean-field team problem and its pre-limit. Let action spaces and observation spaces
be identical for each DM: Ui = U ⊆ Rn and Yi = Y ⊆ Rm for all i ∈ N and some n,m > 0.
Problem (PN ): Consider an N -DM static team with the expected cost of a randomized
policy PNπ ∈ L
N as:∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
:=
∫
1
N
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up
)
PNπ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (dω0, dy
1, . . . , dyN ).(4.3)
The above problem is considered as a pre-limit problem for our infinite-decision maker
team problem. This problem is a special case of (PN ) defined in the previous section since
we have a special structure for the cost function cN which satisfies Assumption 4.1. With
abuse of notation, we call this problem also (PN ) in the rest of this section.
Problem (P∞): Consider infinite-DM static team with the following expected cost of a
randomized policy Pπ ∈ L as
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
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:= lim sup
N→∞
∫
1
N
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up
)
Pπ,N (dγ
1, . . . , dγN)µN (dω0, dy
1, . . . , dyN),(4.4)
where Pπ,N is the marginal of the Pπ ∈ L to the first N components and µN is the marginal
of the fixed probability measure on (ω0, y
1, y2, . . . ) to the first N + 1 components.
First, we present our assumption on the cost function.
ASSUMPTION 4.2. The cost function c : Ω0×Rn×Rn → R+ is continuous in its second
and third arguments for all ω0.
In the following, we present a key result required for our main theorem. Under mild con-
ditions, we show that the optimal expected cost function induced by LNEX and LEX are equal
as N goes to infinity. Hence, by Lemma 4.1, under symmetry, this allows us to show that
without loss of global optimality, optimal policies of static mean-field teams with countably
infinite number of DMs can be considered to be an infinitely exchangeable type.
LEMMA 4.2. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 and Assumption 4.2 hold. Assume further
that U is compact and the cost function is bounded. If observations of DMs are i.i.d. random
vectors conditioned on ω0, then
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
Ppi∈LEX
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0),(4.5)
where Pπ,N is the marginal of the Pπ ∈ LEX to the firstN components and µN is the marginal
of the fixed probability measure on (ω0, y
1, y2, . . . ) to the first N + 1 components.
In the following, we establish an existence of a randomized optimal policy for (P∞).
THEOREM 4.3. Consider a static team problem (P∞) where Assumption 3.1 and As-
sumption 4.2 hold. Assume further that U is compact. If observations of DMs are i.i.d. ran-
dom vectors conditioned on ω0, then there exists a randomized optimal policy P
∗
π for (P∞)
which is in LPR,SYM,
inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
:= lim sup
N→∞
∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈LPR
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
Following from Lemma 4.1, Lemma 4.2, and our analysis in the proof of Theorem 4.3,
thanks to Theorem 3.2, we can show that without losing global optimality, optimal policies
for mean-field teams over any convex set L¯ ⊆ L where LCO,SYM ⊆ L¯ can be considered to be
symmetric and privately randomized (LPR,SYM).
COROLLARY 4.4. Consider a static team problem (P∞) where Assumption 4.2 and As-
sumption 3.1 hold. Assume further U is compact. If observations of DMs are i.i.d. random
vectors conditioned on ω0, then for any convex set L¯ ⊆ L where LCO,SYM ⊆ L¯,
inf
Ppi∈L¯
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
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= inf
Ppi∈LCO,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈L¯∩LEX
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
Proof. The first and the second equalities follow from a similar argument in (Step 4) of
the proof of Theorem 4.3 by replacing L with L¯, and the last equality follows from Theorem
3.2 and the fact that LCO,SYM ⊆ L¯.
Here, we present an example where Theorem 4.3 can be applied but the existence result
of [54, Theorem 12] cannot be applied because the assumption that Ui for each DM is convex
in [54, Theorem 12] is violated.
EXAMPLE 1. Consider a team problem with the following expected cost function
J(γ) = lim sup
N→∞
E
γ
[(
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
ui)−
1
2
)2]
,
where σ(yi) = {∅,Ω} (this corresponds to a team setup where DMs have no measurement,
hence measurable functions (policies) are constant functions), and we consider ui ∈ {0, 1}
for each DM. Clearly, an optimal policy that achieves zero is the one where a matching
partition (such as even numbers vs. odd numbers) among DMs picking ui = 0 and ui = 1,
that is because the cost function is non-negative. One can see that there is an optimal policy
in LPR,SYM since each DM can choose independently a policy zero or one with probability
half and this achieves the expected cost of zero; however, there is no identically deterministic
policy that achieves zero expected cost. We note also that the problem is not a convex problem,
therefore the results in [54, Theorem 12 or Proposition 1] are not applicable to show the
existence of an identical randomized optimal policy, in particular, the action sets are not
convex.
5. Finite horizon dynamic team problems with a symmetric information structure.
In this section, we study dynamic stochastic team problems. All the proofs regarding this
section are presented in Appendix B.
5.1. Information structure and a topology on dynamic control policies. Under the
intrinsic model (see Section 2.1), every DM acts separately. However, depending on the
information structure, it may be convenient to consider a collection of DMs as a single DM
acting at different time instances. In fact, in the classical stochastic control, this is the standard
approach.
According to the discussion above, by considering a collection of DMs as a single DM
(i = 1, . . . , N ) acting at different time instances (t = 0, . . . , T − 1), we define the team
problem with (NT )-DMs as a team with N -DMs:
(i) Let the observation and action spaces be standard Borel spaces and be identical for
each DM (i = 1, . . . , N ) with Yi := Y =
∏T−1
t=0 Y
t, Ui := U =
∏T−1
t=0 U
t,
respectively. The sets of all admissible policies are denoted by Γ =
∏N
i=1 Γi =∏N
i=1
∏T−1
t=0 Γ
t.
(ii) For i = 1, . . . , N , yit := h
i
t(x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t , u
1:N
0:t−1) represents the observation of DM
i
at time t (hits are Borel measurable functions).
(iii) Let (ζ1:N ) := (ζ1, . . . , ζN )where ζi := (xi0, ζ
i
0:T−1) denotes all the uncertainty as-
sociated with DMi including his/her initial states. We assume that (ζi) takes values
in Ωζ (where at each time instances t, it takes value in Ωζt ). Let µ
N denote the law
of ζ1:N .
(iv) Define ω0 as the Ω0-valued cost function relevant exogenous random variable, ω0 :
(Ω,F ,P) → (Ω0,F0), where Ω0 is a Borel space with its Borel σ-field F0. Let
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the expected cost function be defined as JN (γ
1:N ) = Eγ
1:N
[c(ω0, ζ
1:N , u1:N )], for
some Borel measurable cost function c : Ω0 ×
∏N
i=1(Ωζ × Ui) → R+, where
γ1:N = (γ1, γ2, . . . , γN ) and γi = γi0:T−1 for i = 1, . . . , N .
Similar to Section 3.1, we first present an assumption that enables us to define Borel
probability measures on policies for dynamic teams with considering γi : Y → U (a policy
of a single DM (i = 1, . . . , N ) acting at different time instances (t = 0, . . . , T − 1)).
ASSUMPTION 5.1. One of the following conditions holds:
(i) (Independent reduction): for every DMi and for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1, there exists
a probability measure τ it on Y
t and a function ψit : Y
t × Ω0 ×
∏N
p=1(
∏t−1
k=0 Ωζk ×∏t−1
k=0(U
k × Yk)) → R+ continuous in actions such that for all Borel sets A =
A1 × · · · ×AN , we have
νt((y
1
t , . . . , y
N
t ) ∈ A|ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1)
=
N∏
i=1
∫
Ai
ψit(y
i
t, ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1)τ
i
t (dy
i
t).
(ii) (Nested reduction): for every DMi and for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1, there exists a
probability measure ηit on Y
t and a function φit continuous in actions such that for
all Borel sets A in Yt, we have
νt((y
1
t , . . . , y
N
t ) ∈ A|ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1)
=
N∏
i=1
∫
Ai
φit(y
i
t, ω0, x
−i
0 , ζ
−i
0:t−1, y
−i
0:t−1, u
−i
0:t−1)η
i
t(dy
i
t|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1),
and for each DMi through time (t = 0, . . . , T − 1), there exists a static reduction
with the classical information structure (i.e., under the reduction, the information
structure of each DM through time is expanding such that σ(yit) ⊂ σ(y
i
t+1) for
t = 0, . . . , T − 1).
We note that Assumption 5.1(i) allows us to obtain an independent measurements reduc-
tion both through DMs and through time, t = 0, . . . , T − 1 (see Appendix B.1). Assump-
tion 5.1(ii) holds if an independent static reduction exists through DMs and there exists a
nested static reduction for each DM through time, i.e., under the reduction, the information
is expanding for each DM through time (see Appendix B.1). We note that the independent
reduction setup, which is essentially a version of Girsanov’s transformation as recognized in
[24], has been considered first in [60, Eqn(4.2)], and later utilized in [64, p. 114] and [63,
Section 2.2] (for discrete-time partially observed stochastic control, similar arguments had
been presented in [12], [13]). On the other hand, the nested reduction, which is new to the
literature, corresponds to the case where there is a reduction between DMs also through time
where each DM has a perfect recall of his/her information history.
EXAMPLE 2. Let observations of each DMi at time t be yit =
h˜it(ω0, x
1:N
0:t−1, ζ
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1) + v
i
t and x
i
t+1 = f
i
t (x
1:N
0:t , u
1:N
0:t , w
i
t) where h˜
i
t and f
i
t
are continuous in states and actions and ζit := (w
i
t, v
i
t). Let v
i
t admits zero-mean Gaussian
density function θit with positive-definite covariance for all i ∈ N and t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
(i) If Iit := {y
i
t}, then Assumption 5.1(i) holds.
(ii) If Iit := {y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t−1} (or equivalently, observations of each DM
i at time t is y˜it =
[yi0:t, u
i
0:t−1] := h¯t(ω0, x
1:N
0:t−1, ζ
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1, v
i
0:t) for some functions h¯ts which are
continuous in states and actions and additive in the last argument and Iit := {y˜
i
t}),
then Assumption 5.1(ii) holds.
14
That is because, for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and i ∈ N, we
yit = h˜
i
t(ω0, x
1:N
0:t−1, ζ
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1) + v
i
t = κ
i
t(ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1) + v
i
t,(5.1)
for some functions κit continuous in u
1:N
0:t−1 since h˜
i
t and f
i
t are continuous in states and
actions. Hence, we can define
ψit =
θit(y
i
t − κ
i
t(ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1))
θit(y
i
t)
, τ it = θ
i
t(y
i
t)dy
i
t.(5.2)
where ψit is continuous in actions. Similarly, part (ii) can be shown.
Hence, similar to Section 3.1, under Assumption 5.1(i), we define convergence on poli-
cies as:
γi
n
n→∞
−−−−→ γi iff 1{γit,n(yit)∈duit}τ
i
t (dy
i
t)
n→∞
−−−−→
weakly
1{γit(yit)∈duit}τ
i
t (dy
i
t)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Under Assumption 5.1(ii), we define convergence on policies as:
γi
n
n→∞
−−−−→ γi iff 1{γit,n(yi0:t)∈duit}η
i
t(dy
i
0:t)
n→∞
−−−−→
weakly
1{γit(yi0:t)∈duit}η
i
t(dy
i
0:t)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Hence, under Assumption 5.1, we define all the sets of Borel
probability measures on policies defined in Section 3.1 for the dynamic teams by considering
γi : Y → U (a policy of a single DM (i = 1, . . . , N ) acting at different time instances
(t = 0, . . . , T − 1)). We note that the continuity assumption of functions ψit and φ
i
t in actions
in Assumption 5.1 is not required for defining Borel probability measures on policies above;
however, we require this continuity for our existence result.
5.2. Existence and structure of optimal policies for symmetric dynamic team prob-
lems with infinitely many decision makers. In the following, we study the existence and
structure of global optimal policies for dynamic team problems with a symmetric information
structure (that are not necessarily partially nested) and with a finite but large and also infinitely
many decision makers. We note that a related result is [53] where convex mean-field team
problems have been considered under the assumption that the action space is convex for each
DM and the cost function is convex in policies. In particular, we study dynamic mean-field
team problems where the average of states and actions are considered both in dynamics and
the cost function. We note that even if the cost function is convex in actions when there is a
mean-field coupling in dynamics, convexity rarely holds since the information structure un-
der decentralized setup is non-classical, and that may lead to the non-convexity of the team
problem in policies (see for example [65, Section 3.3]).
Now, we recall the definition of the symmetric information structure from [53] (note that
symmetric information structures can be classical, partially nested, or non-classical). Several
examples of dynamic teams with symmetric information structures have been presented in
[53, Section 4].
DEFINITION 5.1. [53] Let the information of DMi acting at time t be described as Iit :=
{yit}. The information structure of a sequentialN -DM team problem is symmetric if
(i) yit = ht(x
i
0, x
−i
0 , ζ
i
0:t, ζ
−i
0:t , u
i
0:t−1, u
−i
0:t−1) where ht is identical for all i =
1, . . . , N (note that the arguments of the function depend on i) and b−i =
(b1, . . . , bi−1, bi+1, . . . , bN) for b = x0, ζ0:t, u0:t−1.
We note that the above definition can be generalized to be applicable for teams with
countably infinite number of DMs. Before, we present the result for dynamic mean-field
teams, we characterize team problems with symmetric information structures in which the
search for an optimal policy can be restricted to policies in LNEX without losing global opti-
mality.
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ASSUMPTION 5.2. For any permutation σ of the set {1, . . . , N}, we have for all ω0,
c(ω0, (ζ
σ)1:N , (uσ)1:N ) = c(ω0, ζ
1:N , u1:N ),(5.3)
where (ζσ)1:N = (ζσ(1), . . . , ζσ(N)) and (uσ)1:N = (uσ(1), . . . , uσ(N)).
Based on the definitions of probability measures on the space of admissible policies (similar
to Section 3.1), we can represent the expected cost of a randomized policy Pπ ∈ LN as
JπN (γ
1:N):=
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
:=
∫
c(ω0, ζ
1:N , γ1(y1), . . . , γN (yN ))Pπ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)(5.4)
×
T−1∏
t=0
νt
(
dy1:Nt
∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, γ10(y10), . . . , γ1t−1(y1t−1), . . . , γNt−1(yNt−1)),
where cN (ζ, γ, y, ω0) := c(ω0, ζ
1:N , γ1(y1), . . . , γN (yN )) and νt is a transition kernel char-
acterizing the joint observations of DMs at time t induced by hts, i.e.,
νt
(
y1:Nt ∈ ·
∣∣∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, u1:N0:t−1
)
:= P
(
ht(x
1
0, x
−1
0 , ζ
1
0:t, ζ
−1
0:t , u
1
0:t−1, u
−1
0:t−1) ∈ ·, . . . ,
ht(x
N
0 , x
−N
0 , ζ
N
0:t, ζ
−N
0:t , u
N
0:t−1, u
−N
0:t−1) ∈ ·
∣∣∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, u1:N0:t−1
)
.
In the second expression in (5.4), with a slight abuse of notation, we used z to represent z1:N
where z can be ζ, y, or γ.
LEMMA 5.2. Consider a dynamic team problem with a symmetric information structure
under Assumption 5.2. Assume L¯N is an arbitrary convex subset of LN . Let Assumption 5.1
hold and assume
(a) (ζ1, . . . , ζN ) are exchangeable conditioned on ω0,
(b) for all policies γ ∈ Γ, and for all A = A1 × · · · ×AN where Ai ∈ B(Yt),
T−1∏
t=0
νt
(
A
∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, γ10(y10), . . . , γ1t−1(y1t−1), . . . , γNt−1(yNt−1))(5.5)
=
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
νit
(
Ai
∣∣∣ω0, xi0, ζi0:t−1, y↓↓i↓t , γ↓↓i↓t (y↓↓i↓t )
)
,
where y
↓↓i
↓t corresponds to the observations of all DM
js (including DMi itself) at time in-
stances p = 0, . . . , t − 1 where the action of DMjs at time p affects the observation of DMi
at time t (γ
↓↓i
↓t (y
↓↓i
↓t ) can be defined similarly). Then
inf
Ppi∈L¯N
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈L¯N∩LNEX
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).
In the following, we present an existence of a globally optimal policy for dynamic mean-
field teams with infinitely many decision makers. Define state dynamics and observations as
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(2.3) and (2.4). The information structure of DMi at time t is Iit = {y
i
t}, and ζ
i
t := (w
i
t, v
i
t)
(with ζi0 := (x
i
0, w
i
0, v
i
0)) denotes the uncertainty corresponding to dynamics and observations
at time t for DMi which are exogenous random vectors in the standard Borel space. First, we
re-state the infinite decision maker mean-field team problem and its pre-limit.
Problem (PNT ): Consider anN -DM dynamic team with the expected cost of a random-
ized policy PNπ ∈ L
N as:
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
:=
∫
1
N
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, x
i
t, γ
i
t(y
i
t),
1
N
N∑
p=1
γ
p
t (y
p
t ),
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t
)
PNπ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (dζ1:N |ω0)
×
T−1∏
t=0
νt
(
dy1:Nt
∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, γ10(y10), . . . , γ1t−1(y1t−1), . . . , γNt−1(yNt−1))P(dω0),
where
cN (ζ, γ, y, ω0) :=
1
N
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, x
i
t, γ
i
t(y
i
t),
1
N
N∑
p=1
γ
p
t (y
p
t ),
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t
)
,
and where
xit = ft
(
xit, γ
i
t(y
i
t),
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
γ
p
t (y
p
t ), w
i
t
)
,
yit = ht
(
xi0:t, γ
i
0(y
i
0), . . . , γ
i
t−1(y
i
t−1), v
i
0:t
)
.(5.6)
The above problem is considered as a pre-limit problem for our infinite-decision maker team
problem. We note that N -DM teams of (PNT ) is a special case of (5.4) since we have a
special structure for the cost function cN and observations ht which satisfy Assumption 5.2
and Definition 5.1, respectively. With a slight abuse of notation, we use the same notation of
cN and ht in the cost function and observation of each decision maker.
REMARK 2. Our analysis below also allows a more general observations for each DM
where the observations of each DM at time t can be explicitly functions of average of previous
states and actions as
yit = ht
(
xi0:t, u
i
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
0:t−1, v
i
0:t
)
.
However, to simplify the presentations of theorems and proofs and emphasize in the decen-
tralization of optimal policy, for the rest of the paper, we consider (5.6).
Problem (P∞T ): Consider infinite-DM static team with the following expected cost of a
randomized policy Pπ ∈ L as:
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
:= lim sup
N→∞
∫
1
N
T−1∑
t=0
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, x
i
t, γ
i
t(y
i
t),
1
N
N∑
p=1
γ
p
t (y
p
t ),
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t
)
Pπ,N (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )P(dω0)
×
T−1∏
t=0
νt
(
dy1:Nt
∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, γ10(y10), . . . , γ1t−1(y1t−1), . . . , γNt−1(yNt−1))µN (dζ1:N |ω0).
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where Pπ,N is the restriction of Pπ ∈ L to its first N components and µ
N is the marginal of
the fixed probability measure on (ω0, ζ
1, ζ2, . . . ) to the first N + 1 components.
ASSUMPTION 5.3. Assume Assumption 5.1 holds with functions ψit and φ
i
t for every
DMi and t = 0, . . . , T − 1 are of the following forms:
ψit
(
yit, ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
0:t−1
)
φit
(
yit, ω0,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
0:t−1
)
.
ASSUMPTION 5.4. Assume
(i) Functions ft and ht are continuous in the states and actions and fts are bounded,
(ii) The cost function in (2.5), c : Ω0 × X × U × U × X → R+, is continuous in the
second, third, fourth, and fifth arguments, where X, U denote the state space and
action space of DMs at each time instances for all ω0.
ASSUMPTION 5.5. Assume
(i) (x10, x
2
0, . . . ) are i.i.d. random vectors conditioned on ω0,
(ii) for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, {wit}i∈N are i.i.d. random vectors, and for i ∈ N,
{wit}
T−1
t=0 are mutually independent, and independent of ω0 and (x
1
0, x
2
0, . . . ). For
t = 0, . . . , T − 1, {vit}i∈N are i.i.d. random vectors, and for i ∈ N, {v
i
t}
T−1
t=0 are
mutually independent, and independent of ω0, (x
1
0, x
2
0, . . . ), and w
i
ts for i ∈ N and
t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Before presenting our main result for dynamic mean-field teams, we present sufficient
conditions under which the expected cost function induced by optimal policies in LNEX and
LEX are equal asN goes to infinity, hence, following from Lemma 5.2, under symmetry, this
shows that without loss of global optimality, optimal policies of dynamic mean-field teams
can be considered to be an infinitely exchangeable type.
LEMMA 5.3. Consider the team problem (PNT ) where Assumption 5.3, Assumption 5.4,
and Assumption 5.5 hold. Assume further that U is compact, then
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
Ppi∈LEX
∫
Pπ,N(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0),(5.7)
where Pπ,N is the restriction of Pπ ∈ LEX to its first N components and µ
N is the marginal
of the fixed probability measure on (ω0, ζ
1, ζ2, . . . ) to the first N + 1 components.
In the following, we establish an existence and structural result for a randomized optimal
policy of (P∞T ).
THEOREM 5.4. Consider a mean-field team problem (P∞T ) with (P
N
T ) having a symmet-
ric information structure for everyN . AssumeU is compact, and Assumption 5.3, Assumption
5.4, and Assumption 5.5 hold. Then, there exists a randomized optimal policy P ∗π for (P
∞
T )
which is in LPR,SYM,
inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
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:= lim sup
N→∞
∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈L
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).
COROLLARY 5.5. Consider a mean-field team problem (P∞T ) with (P
N
T ) having a sym-
metric information structure for every N . Assume further that U is compact and Assumption
5.3, Assumption 5.4, Assumption 5.5 hold. Then for any convex set of policies L¯ ⊆ L where
LCO,SYM ⊆ L¯,
inf
Ppi∈L¯
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈LCO,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= inf
Ppi∈L¯∩LEX
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).
Proof. Proof is similar to that of Corollary 4.4 using Theorem 5.4 and Lemma 5.3.
6. Approximations of optimal policies for symmetric N -DM stochastic team prob-
lems. In this section, we present approximation results of optimal policies for N -DM team
problems. We show that for large N , symmetric policies are nearly optimal and the restric-
tion of the optimal infinite solution to the finite team problem is nearly optimal for large N .
All the proofs regarding this section are presented in Appendix C. We first consider the static
case. To present the ideas more effectively, we first define the following set of probability
measures on policies as:
LNPA :=
{
Pπ ∈ L
N
∣∣∣∣for all Ai ∈ B(Γi) : Pπ(γ1 ∈ A1, . . . , γN ∈ AN ) =
N∏
i=1
1{γi∈Ai}
}
,
where the above set corresponds to the deterministic probability measures in LNPR. Hence,
inf
γ
N
∈ΓN
1
N
E
γ
N
[ N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up
)]
= inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
THEOREM 6.1. Consider a static team problem (PN ) (see (4.3)) where Assumption 3.1
and Assumption 4.2 hold. Assume L¯N is an arbitrary convex subset of LN such that LNCO ⊆
L¯N . Assume further U is compact, and the cost function is bounded. If observations of DMs
are i.i.d. random vectors conditioned on ω0, then
(i)
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR, SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫN ,(6.1)
and
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR, SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
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≤ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫN ,(6.2)
where ǫN → 0 asN goes to infinity.
(ii) If P ∗π ∈ LPR,SYM is an optimal policy of (P∞), then there exist ǫ¯N ≥ 0 where for
some subsequences ǫ¯N → 0 as N goes to infinity and
∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫN + ǫ¯N ,(6.3)
where P ∗π,N is the restriction of P
∗
π to the first N components.
We note that since LNPA is not a convex set, (6.1) does not immediately imply (6.2) but the
result can be established since deterministic policies are optimal for N -DM teams.
Similarly, we present approximation results of optimal policies for symmetric dynamic
N -DM team problems.
THEOREM 6.2. Consider a dynamic team problem (PTN ) (see (2.5)). Assume L¯
N is an
arbitrary convex subset of LN such that LNCO ⊆ L¯
N . Assume further U is compact, and
Assumption 5.3, Assumption 5.4, and Assumption 5.5 hold. If the cost function is bounded,
then
(i)
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR, SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0) + ǫN ,(6.4)
and
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR, SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0) + ǫN ,(6.5)
where ǫN → 0 asN goes to infinity.
(ii) If P ∗π ∈ LPR,SYM is an optimal policy of (P
T
∞), then there exist ǫ¯N ≥ 0 where for
some subsequences ǫ¯N → 0 as N goes to infinity and
∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0) + ǫN + ǫ¯N ,
where P ∗π,N is the restriction of P
∗
π to the first N components.
Proof. Proof follows from a similar steps as the proof of Theorem 6.1 using the results
of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.4 .
Appendix A. Proofs from Section 4.
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A.1. Proof of Lemma 4.1. For any permutation σ ∈ SN , we define P σπ ∈ L¯
N as a
permutation, σ, of arguments of Pπ ∈ L¯N , i.e., for Ai ∈ B(Γi)
P σπ (γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ2 ∈ AN ) := Pπ(γ
σ(1) ∈ A1, . . . , γσ(N) ∈ AN ).
We have∫
P σπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) =
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN)µN (dy1, . . . , dyN |ω0)
× P σπ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN)P(dω0)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN)µN (dy1, . . . , dyN |ω0)(A.1)
× Pπ(dγ
σ(1), . . . , dγσ(N))P(dω0)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
σ(1), . . . , uσ(N))µN (dyσ(1), . . . , dyσ(N)|ω0)(A.2)
× Pπ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN)P(dω0)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN)µN (dy1, . . . , dyN |ω0)(A.3)
× Pπ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN)P(dω0)
=
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0),
where (A.1) follows from the definition of P σπ and (A.2) follows from relabeling u
σ(i), yσ(i)
with ui, yi for all i = 1, . . . , N and the fact that ui = γi(yi). Equality (A.3) follows from
the hypothesis that observations are exchangeable given ω0 and Assumption 4.1.
Let ǫ ≥ 0, and consider P ∗π,ǫ ∈ L¯
N such that
∫
P ∗π,ǫ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) ≤ inf
Ppi∈L¯N
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫ.
Consider P˜π,ǫ as a convex combination of all possible permutations of P
∗
π,ǫ by averaging
them. Since L¯N is convex, we have P˜π,ǫ ∈ L¯N . Also, we have P˜π,ǫ ∈ LNEX, and for any
permutation σ ∈ SN , we have
P˜π,ǫ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN ) :=
∑
σ∈SN
1
|SN |
P ∗,σπ,ǫ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )
= P˜ σπ,ǫ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN ),
where |SN | denotes the cardinality of the set SN , and the second equality follows from the
fact that the sum is over all permutation σ by taking average of them. Therefore, P˜π,ǫ is in
L¯N ∩ LNEX. We have,∫
P˜π,ǫ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) :=
∫
(
∑
σ∈SN
ασP
∗,σ
π,ǫ )(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
=
∑
σ∈SN
ασ
∫
P ∗,σπ,ǫ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
=
∑
σ∈SN
ασ
∫
P ∗π,ǫ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
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≤ inf
Ppi∈L¯N
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫ,
where the second equality is true since the map Pπ →
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) is
linear and the third equality follows from (A.3). Since P˜N,ǫ ∈ L¯N ∩ LNEX, we have∫
P˜π,ǫ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) ≥ inf
Ppi∈L¯N∩LNEX
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
Hence, for any ǫ ≥ 0, we have
inf
Ppi∈L¯N∩LNEX
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) ≤ inf
Ppi∈L¯N
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫ.
Since ǫ is arbitrary, this completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 4.2. To prove Lemma 4.2, we use two following results by Di-
aconis and Friedman [27, Theorem 13] and Aldous [1, Proposition 7.20] (see also [37] for
more general results) which we recall for reader’s convenience:
THEOREM A.1. [27, Theorem 13] Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn) be an n-exchangeable and
Z = (Z1, Z2, . . . ) be an infinitely exchangeable sequence of random variables with
L(Z1, . . . , Zk) = L(YI1 , . . . , YIk) for all k ≥ 1 where the indices (I1, I2, . . . ) are i.i.d. ran-
dom variables with the uniform distribution on the set {1, . . . , n}. Then, for allm = 1, . . . , n,∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣L(Y1, . . . , Ym)− L(Z1, . . . , Zm)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
TV
≤
m(m− 1)
2n
,(A.4)
where L(·) denotes the law of random variables and || · ||TV is the total variation norm.
THEOREM A.2. [1, Proposition 7.20] Let X = (X1, X2, . . . ) be an infinitely ex-
changeable sequence of random variables taking values in a Polish space X and directed
by a random measure α (i.e., α is a P(X)-valued random variable and Pr(X ∈ A) =∫
P(X)
∏∞
i=1 α(A
i)θ(dα) where θ is the distribution of α and Ai ∈ B(X) and (A =
A1 ×A2 × . . . ), see [1, Definition 2.6]). Suppose that either for each n
(1) X(n) = (X
(n)
1 , X
(n)
2 , . . . ) is infinitely exchangeable directed by αn, or
(2) X(n) = (X
(n)
1 , . . . , X
(n)
n ) is n-exchangeable with empirical measure αn.
Then,X(n) converges in distribution toX
(
X(n)
d
−−−−→
n→∞
X
)
if and only if αn
d
−−−−→
n→∞
α.
We note that by convergence in distribution to an infinite sequence, we mean the following:
X(n)
d
−−−−→
n→∞
X if and only if (X
(n)
1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )
d
−−−−→
n→∞
(X1, . . . , Xm) for each m ≥ 1 [1,
page 55].
Using the above theorems, we now complete the Proof of Lemma 4.2. Following from
[63, Theorem 5.1] (since the cost function is continuous on the second and the third argument
and since observations are i.i.d.), there exists a deterministic optimal policy for (PN ). More-
over, by Lemma 4.1, for every finite N , there exists an optimal policy in LNEX. Consider a
sequence {P ∗,Nπ }N , where for everyN ≥ 1, P
∗,N
π ∈ L
N
EX and
(A.5)
∫
P ∗,Nπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) = inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
In the following, we show (4.5) in two steps. In the first step, for every N , we use the con-
struction in Theorem A.1 to construct an infinitely exchangeable policy P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX using
P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX by considering the indices as a sequence of i.i.d. random variables with uni-
form distribution on the set {1, . . . , N}, and we show that there exists a subsequence of joint
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measures on the first coordinate and the average of induced actions of policies P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX
and observations. Then, we show that the expected cost functions induced by P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX
converges through a subsequence to a limit induced by an infinitely exchangeable policies
P
∗,∞
π,N .
(Step 1): Let (I1, I2, . . . ) be i.i.d. random variables with uniform distribution on the set
{1, . . . , N}. For a fixed N and for any P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX, we construct P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX as follows:
for everyN andm and for all Ai ∈ B(Γi)
P
∗,∞
π,N (γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γm ∈ Am) := P ∗,Nπ (γ
I1 ∈ A1, . . . , γIm ∈ Am).
where P
∗,∞
π,N is the restriction of P
∗,∞
π,PNpi
∈ LEX to the first N components. We note that
P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX because we use i.i.d. sequence (I1, I2, . . . ) for indexing probability measures
on the space of policies, hence, for every fixed N and P ∗,Nπ , P
∗,∞
π,N is i.i.d through DMs and
hence it is infinitely exchangeable.
Let u
∗,i
N = γ
i
N (y
i) where random variables (γ1N , . . . , γ
N
N ) are determined by P
∗,N
π ∈
LNEX and the fixed measure µ on observations. Let u
∗,i
∞,N = γ
i
N,∞(y
i)where random variables
(γ1N,∞, . . . , γ
N
N,∞) are determined by P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX and the fixed measure µ on observations.
Since under the reduction (Assumption 3.1), observations are i.i.d. and also independent of
ω0, following from Theorem A.1, we have for everym ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣L(γ1N , . . . , γmN , y1, . . . , ym)− L(γ1N,∞, . . . , γmN,∞, y1, . . . , ym)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣L(γ1N , . . . , γmN )
m∏
i=1
L(yi)− L(γ1N,∞, . . . , γ
m
N,∞)
m∏
i=1
L(yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
TV
−−−−→
N→∞
0.(A.6)
where (A.6) follows from the fact that (γ1N , . . . , γ
N
N ) and (γ
1
N,∞, . . . , γ
N
N,∞) are random vari-
ables with joint probability measures P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX and P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX
∣∣
N
, respectively. Since
U is compact and the probability measures on observation is fixed, any joint probability mea-
sures on acttions and observations is tight, hence, {L(γi∞,N )}N is tight for each DM and
by exchangeablity L(γi∞,N ) = L(γ
1
∞,N ). Hence, we can find a subsequence such that
L(γi∞,l) −−−→
l→∞
L(γi∞) for all i ∈ N. Since marginals of {L(γ
1
∞,l, . . . , γ
m
∞,l)}l are tight,
for eachm ≥ 1, there exists a further subsequence
L(γ1∞,n, . . . , γ
m
∞,n) −−−−→
n→∞
L(γ1∞, . . . , γ
m
∞),
where (γ1∞, γ
2
∞, . . . ) is infinitely exchangeable and induced by P
∗,∞
π ∈ LEX since the set
of infinitely exchangeable random variables is closed under the weak-convergence topology
where by weak convergence of an infinite sequence, we mean weak convergence of finite
restrictions (see for example proof of Theorem 3.2 where we show that any convergent se-
quence {Pnπ }n ⊂ LEX converges to a limit Pπ ⊂ LEX, also we refer the readers to [1, p. 55]
for more general results). Hence, following from (A.6), for eachm ≥ 1
L(γ1n, . . . , γ
m
n ) −−−−→
n→∞
L(γ1∞, . . . , γ
m
∞).
By construction of random variables u∗,in = γ
i
n(y
i) and u∗,i∞ = γ
i
∞(y
i) and since random
variables γins are independent of y
is, we have for eachm ≥ 1
(u∗,1n , . . . , u
∗,m
n )
d
−−−−→
n→∞
(u1∞, . . . , u
m
∞),
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where (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) is induced by an infinitely exchangeable policies P
∗,∞
π ∈ LEX. Follow-
ing from Theorem A.2, P-almost surely
Fn(A) := F
ω
n (A) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ
u
∗,i
n (ω)
(A)
d
−−−−→
n→∞
αω(A),(A.7)
whereA ∈ U and ω denotes the sample path dependence and α is the directing measure of an
infinitely exchangeable random variables (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) (that is α(ω,A) = P(u
∗,i
∞ ∈ A|H)
P-almost surely for all A ∈ U where H is the σ-field generated by P(U)-valued random
variable α [1]). Following from (A.7), since action space is compact, P-almost surely
µn := µ
ω
n :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
u∗,in (ω) =
∫
U
uFn(du)
d
−−−−→
n→∞
µ :=
∫
U
uαω(du).(A.8)
Define P˜ ∗,n as the joint probability measure of (u∗,1n , µn, y) where marginals on
y := (y1, y2, . . . ) is fixed to be
∏∞
i=1Q(dy
i). Since marginals on (u∗,1n , µn) are tight and
marginals on y is fixed, {P˜ ∗,n}n is tight. Hence, there exists a subsubsequence {P˜ ∗,k}k con-
verges weakly to P˜ ∗ as k goes to infinity. This implies that marginals {P˜ ∗,k}k on (u
∗,1
k , µk)
converges to the marginals of P˜ ∗ on (u∗,1, µ), hence, P˜ ∗ is induced by (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) which
is infinitely exchangeable and is induced by a policy in LEX.
(Step 2): We have
lim sup
N→∞
∫
P ∗,Nπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
c(ω0, γ
i(yi),
1
N
N∑
p=1
γp(yp))P ∗,Nπ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )
×
N∏
i=1
µ(dyi|ω0)P(dω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫
c(ω0, γ
i(yi),
1
N
N∑
p=1
γp(yp))P ∗,Nπ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )(A.9)
×
N∏
i=1
f(ω0, y
i)Q(dyi)P(dω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ ∫
∏
∞
i=N+1
Y
c(ω0, u
1, µN )P˜
∗,N (du1, dµN , dy)
∞∏
i=1
f(ω0, y
i)P(dω0)(A.10)
≥ lim
k→∞
∫ ∫
∏
∞
i=k+1
Y
c(ω0, u
1, µk)P˜
∗,k(du1, dµn, dy)
∞∏
i=1
f(ω0, y
i)P(dω0)(A.11)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, µ)P˜ ∗(du1, dµ, , dy)
∞∏
i=1
f(ω0, y
i)P(dω0)(A.12)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
inf
Ppi∈LEX
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).(A.13)
where (A.9) follows from the hypothesis that observations are i.i.d. conditioned on ω0,
hence, under Assumption 3.1, in the new (equivalent) cost function, observations are i.i.d.
and independent of ω0. (A.10) follows from integrating over the set
∏∞
i=N+1 Y and since
(u∗,1N , . . . , u
∗,N
N ) is N -exchangeable. Inequality (A.11) follows from the assumption that the
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cost function is bounded and limsup is the greatest subsequence limit of a bounded sequence
where k is the index of the subsequence considered in (Step 1). Equality (A.12) follows from
the dominated convergence theorem and following from the assumption that the cost function
is bounded and continuous in the second and third arguments and the fact that probability
measures on observations are fixed and since by (Step 1) {P˜ ∗,k}k converges weakly to P˜ ∗
as k goes to infinity. Inequality (A.13) follows from the fact that P˜ ∗ is the joint measure
with the first coordinate (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) which is infinitely exchangeable and it is induced by
a policy in LEX. The above inequalities are equalities since the opposite direction is true (that
is because LEX
∣∣
N
⊂ LNEX) and this completes the proof.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 4.3. We complete the proof in four steps.
(Step 1): Following from [63, Theorem 5.1] (since the cost function is continuous on
the second and the third argument and since observations are i.i.d.), there exists an optimal
policy for (PN ), and by Lemma 4.1, this optimal policy can be in LNEX. Consider a sequence
{P ∗,Nπ }N , where for everyN ≥ 1, P
∗,N
π ∈ L
N
EX and∫
P ∗,Nπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) = inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
(Step 2): In this step, we show that to establish an existence result, it is sufficient to show
the convergenceof the expected cost induced by an optimal policy inLNPR,SYM ofN -DM teams
to the expected cost induced by a policy LPR,SYM of mean-field teams through a subsequence
as N goes to infinity. We first lift the space of admissible policies, and we represent any
admissible policy as a probability measure in L (which is convex) and LEX ⊂ L. We have
inf
Ppi∈L
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)(A.14)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)(A.15)
≥ lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)min {M, c
N(γ, y, ω0)}(A.16)
= lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
Ppi∈LEX
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)min {M, c
N(γ, y, ω0)}(A.17)
= lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
CO,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)min {M, c
N (γ, y, ω0)}(A.18)
= lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)min {M, c
N (γ, y, ω0)}(A.19)
≥ inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)(A.20)
≥ inf
Ppi∈LCO,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)(A.21)
≥ inf
Ppi∈L
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0),(A.22)
where (A.14) follows from exchanging limsup with inf and the fact that Pπ,N ∈ LN
for any Pπ ∈ L, and (A.15) follows from Lemma 4.1. Inequality (A.16) follows from
min {M, cN(γ, y, ω0)} ≤ cN (γ, y, ω0). Equality (A.17) follows from Lemma 4.2 and (A.18)
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follows from Theorem 3.2. The set of extreme points of the convex set LNCO,SYM is L
N
PR,SYM
(that is because, LNCO,SYM corresponds to the randomized policies with common and individ-
ual independent randomness where each DM choose an identical randomized policy), hence,
(A.19) is true since LNCO,SYM is convex, and the map
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) :
LNCO,SYM → R is linear. Inequalities (A.21) and (A.22) follow from the fact that LPR,SYM ⊂
LCO,SYM ⊂ L. Hence, by (A.22), this chain of inequalities must be chain of equalities.
In the next two steps, we justify (A.20) through showing that there exists a subsequence
of policies induced by symmetric/identical private randomization whose weak-limit achieves
(A.20).
(Step 3): Consider the set of probability measures of N -DM teams of LNPR,SYM. For
each DM, we can equivalently represent any randomized policy as a probability measure
on (Ui × Yi) where the marginal on observations is fixed. Since the team is static, this
decouples the policy spaces from the policies of the previous decision makers. Following
from symmetry, we can represent each DM’s policy space as {P ∈ P(Ui × Yi)|P (B) =∫
B
Π(dui|yi)µ(dyi)} where B ∈ B(Ui × Yi) and Π is an identical randomized policy from
the set of stochastic kernels from space of observations to space of actions for each DM.
Since U is compact, the marginals on U will be relatively compact. Since the marginals
are relatively compact, the collection of all measures with these relatively compact marginals
are also relatively compact (see e.g., [62, Proof of Theorem 2.4]) and hence the policy space
is relatively compact. Following from symmetry, the set of individual randomized policies
for each DM is closed under product topology where each coordinate converges in the weak
convergence topology, that is because,
lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
∫
1
N
N∑
i=1
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up
)} N∏
i=1
Π∗N (du
i|yi)µN (dy1, . . . , dyN |ω0)
= lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
∫
1
N
N∑
i=1
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up
)} N∏
i=1
Π∗N (du
i|yi)µ(dyi|ω0)
where the above equality follows from the hypothesis that conditioned on ω0, observations are
i.i.d., hence, there exists a subsequence of individual randomized policies for each DM con-
verges weakly to the limit which is identical for each DM. We also note that following from
[62, Theorem 2.3 and 2.5] based on Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [9, 10] for
any finite N , and for any randomized strategy Π∗N for each DM, there exists a deterministic
policy (where we denoted by γ∗N ).
(Step 4): Define
QN (B) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δβi
N
(B),
where βiN = (u
i,∗
N , y
i), B ∈ Z := (Ui × Yi), ui,∗N is the action induced by Π
∗
N in (Step 3),
and δY (·) denotes the Dirac measure for any random vector Y . We note that u
i,∗
N for any finite
N can be also viewed as u
i,∗
N = γ
∗
N (y
i) following from Blackwell’s irrelevant information
theorem as it is discussed in (Step 3). We also note that the empirical measure QN depends
on ω0 since observations are not necessarily independent of ω0.
Now, we have
lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)min {M, c
N (γ, y, ω0)}
= lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
∫ (∫
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQN(du × Y)
)}
QN (du, dy)
)
(A.23)
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×
N∏
i=1
Π∗N (du
i|dyi)µ(dyi|ω0)P(dω0)
= lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
∫ (∫
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQN(du × Y)
)}
QN (du, dy)
)
(A.24)
×
∞∏
i=1
P
∗,ω0
N (du
i, dyi)P(dω0)
≥ lim
M→∞
lim
n→∞
∫ (∫
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQn(du× Y)
)}
Qn(du, dy)
)
(A.25)
×
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0n (du
i, dyi)P(dω0)
= lim
M→∞
∫
lim
n→∞
∫ (∫
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQn(du× Y)
)}
Qn(du, dy)
)
(A.26)
×
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0n (du
i, dyi)P(dω0)
≥ lim
M→∞
∫ ∫ (∫
min
{
M, c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQ(du× Y)
)}
Q(du, dy)
)
(A.27)
×
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0(dui, dyi)P(dω0)
=
∫ (∫
c
(
ω0, u,
∫
U
uQ(du× Y)
)
Q(du, dy)
) ∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0(dui, dyi)P(dω0)(A.28)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫
1
N
N∑
i=1
c
(
ω0, u
i,
1
N
N∑
p=1
ui
) N∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0(dui, dyi)P (dω0)(A.29)
≥ inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→N
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)(A.30)
where P
∗,ω0
N (du
i, dyi) := Π∗N (du
i|dyi)µ(dyi|ω0) = Π∗N (du
i|dyi)
∏∞
i=1 f(ω0, y
i)Q(dyi).
Equality (A.23) follows from the definition of the empirical measure, the hypothesis that
observations are i.i.d. conditioned on ω0, and symmetry of the optimal policies. Equality
(A.24) follows from symmetry of optimal policies since every DM apply an identical policy,
the set of policies can be extended to infinite product space and then we can consider the
expected cost by integrating over
∏∞
i=N (U
i × Yi). Inequality (A.25) follows from the fact
that limsup is the greatest convergent subsequence limit for a bounded sequence, where we
denoted the convergent subsequence of coordinates of policies in (Step 3) with n ∈ I ⊂ N.
Equality (A.26) follows from the law of total expectation, and the dominated convergence
theorem.
Fix the convergent subsequence n, following from symmetry and the hypothesis that
observations are i.i.d. conditioned on ω0, we have β
i
n = (u
∗,i
n , y
i) are i.i.d. conditioned on
ω0. In the following, first, using a similar argument as the proof of [54, Theorem 8], for a
continuous bounded function g ∈ Cb(Z), we show that
P
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
g(ζin)− E(g(ζ
i
∞)|ω0)
∣∣∣∣ = 0
}∣∣∣∣ω0
)
= 1,(A.31)
where βi∞ = (u
∗,i
∞ , y
i) and u∗,i∞ is induced by a policy P
∗,ω0 (the weak limit of a subsequence
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{P ∗,ω0n }n as n→∞). Define
Q˜n(B) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δβi
∞
(B),
where βi∞ = (u
∗,i
∞ , y
i), B ∈ Z := (Ui×Yi), and u∗,i∞ is induced by a policy P
∗,ω0 (the weak
limit of a subsequence {P ∗,ω0n }n as n → ∞). For every ǫ > 0 and for g ∈ Cb(Z), we have
P-almost surely
lim
N→∞
P
(∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQn −
∫
gdQ˜n
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫ
∣∣∣∣ω0
)
≤ ǫ−1 lim
N→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
E
(∣∣∣∣g(u∗,in , yi)− g(u∗,i∞ , yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ω0
)
(A.32)
= ǫ−1 lim
N→∞
E
(∣∣∣∣g(u∗,in , yi)− g(u∗,i∞ , yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ω0
)
(A.33)
= ǫ−1E
(
lim
N→∞
∣∣∣∣g(u∗,in , yi)− g(u∗,i∞ , yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣ω0
)
= 0,(A.34)
where (A.32) follows from Markov’s inequality, the triangle inequality and the definition of
the empirical measure, and (A.33) follows from the fact that (u∗,in , y
i) and (u∗,i∞ , y
i) are i.i.d.
random vectors conditioned on ω0. Since g is bounded and continuous, the dominated conver-
gence theorem implies (A.34). Hence, for every subsequence there exists a subsubsequence
such that P-almost surely P
({
ω ∈ Ω
∣∣∣∣ liml→∞
∣∣∣∣ ∫ gdQnl − ∫ gdQ˜nl
∣∣∣∣ = 0
}∣∣∣∣ω0
)
= 1.
Since conditioned on ω0, (u
∗,i
∞ , y
i) are i.i.d. random vectors, the strong law of large
numbers implies that P-almost surely
P
({
ω ∈ Ω : lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
i=1
g(βi∞)− E(g(β
i
∞)|ω0)
∣∣∣∣ = 0
}∣∣∣∣ω0
)
= 1,(A.35)
hence, P
(
{ω ∈ Ω| lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∫ gdQ˜n − ∫ gdQ
∣∣∣ = 0}
∣∣∣∣ω0
)
= 1 P-almost surely. Hence,
through choosing a suitable subsubsequence, conditioned on ω0,
lim
n→∞
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQn −
∫
gdQ
∣∣∣∣≤ limn→∞
( ∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQn −
∫
gdQ˜n
∣∣∣∣+
∣∣∣∣
∫
gdQ˜n −
∫
gdQ
∣∣∣∣
)
= 0,
where with slightly abuse of notations, we used the same index n for the subsubsequence that
converges P-almost surely, and this implies (A.31).
We note that (A.31) holds for the subsequence n, for any realization of ω0, follow-
ing from the strong law of large numbers. Consider a countable family of measure deter-
mining functions T ⊂ Cb(Z), then the empirical measures {Qn}n converges weakly to
Q = L(βi∞|ω0) P-almost surely, hence, empirical measureQ is induced by the policy P
∗,ω0 .
We define the w-s topology on the above set of probability measures on (Ω0 × Ui × Yi),
that is, the coarsest topology on P(Ω0×Ui×Yi) under which
∫
fˆ(ω0, u, y)P (dω0, du, dy) :
P(Ω0×Ui×Yi)→ R is continuous for every measurable and bounded fˆ which is continuous
in u and y but need not to be continuous in ω0 (see e.g., [55] and [63, Theorem 5.6]). Hence,
(A.27) follows from a similar argument as in [54, Theorem 12] based on the generalized
convergence theorem for varying measures in [56, Theorem 3.5], since
fn := min
{
M, c
(
ω0, ·,
∫
U
uQN(du× Y)
)}
cont
−−→ f := min
{
M, c
(
ω0, ·,
∫
U
uQ(du× Y)
)}
,
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where we recall that fn converges continuously to f if and only if fn(un)→ f(u) whenever
un → u as n → ∞ (that is because the cost function is continuous in the second and third
arguments and since conditioned on ω0, action spaces are compact, and thanks to symmetry,
actions induced by identical policies are i.i.d.) Equality (A.28) follows from the monotone
convergence theorem, and (A.29) follows from the fact that the limit policy, P ∗,ω0 , does not
depend on N and it is identical for each DM, hence, (A.29) is true using a similar analysis
as (A.27). Inequality (A.30) follows from the fact that the limit policy, P ∗,ω0(dui, dyi) :=
Π∗(dui|dyi)µ(dyi|ω0), achieving (A.29) belongs to LPR,SYM. That is because, following
from (Step 3), for each DM, the set of policies is closed under the product topology where
each coordinate converges weakly, hence, the limit policy is a randomized policy induced by
a subsequence of N -DM optimal policies (which are symmetric through DMs). This implies
(A.30) and completes the proof.
Appendix B. Proofs from Section 5.
B.1. Independent measurement reduction under Assumption 5.1. Under Assump-
tion 5.1(i), we can represent the expected cost as
JN (γ
1:N ):=
∫
c(ω0, u
1
0:T−1, . . . , u
N
0:T−1)µ
N (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)
×
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
1{γit(yit)∈duit}ν
i
t
(
dyit
∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, u1:N0:t−1)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1
0:T−1, . . . , u
N
0:T−1)µ
N (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)(B.1)
×
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
1{γit(yit)∈duit}ψ
i
t
(
yit, ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1
)
τ it (dy
i
t)
=
∫
cs(ω0, ζ
1:N , u1:N0:T−1, y
1:N
0:T−1)µ
N (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)
×
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
1{γit(yit)∈duit}τ
i
t (dy
i
t),
where the new (equivalent) cost function is
cs(ω0, ζ
1:N , u1:N0:T−1, y
1:N
0:T−1) = c(ω0, u
1:N
0:T−1)
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
ψit
(
yit, ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1
)
,
and (B.1) follows from Assumption 5.1(i).
Similarly, under Assumption 5.1(ii), we have
JN (γ
1:N )=
∫
c(ω0, u
1
0:T−1, . . . , u
N
0:T−1)µ
N (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
1{γit(yit)∈duit}(B.2)
×
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
φit
(
yit, ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1
)
ηit(dy
i
t|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1)
=
∫
c˜s(ω0, ζ
1:N , u1:N0:T−1, y
1:N
0:T−1)µ
N (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)
×
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
1{γit(yit)∈duit}η
i
t(dy
i
t|x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1),
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where the new (equivalent) cost function is
c˜s(ω0, ζ
1:N , u1:N0:T−1, y
1:N
0:T−1) = c(ω0, u
1:N
0:T−1)
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
φit
(
yit, ω0, x
1:N
0 , ζ
1:N
0:t−1, y
1:N
0:t−1, u
1:N
0:t−1
)
,
and (B.2) follows from Assumption 5.1(ii) under the independent static reduction through
DMs and nested static reduction through time for each DM.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 5.2. We follow the steps of the proof of Lemma 4.1. For any
permutation σ ∈ SN , we define P
σ
π ∈ L¯
N as a permutation σ of arguments of Pπ ∈ L¯
N , i.e.,
for Ai ∈ B(Γi)
P σπ (γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ2 ∈ AN ) := Pπ(γ
σ(1) ∈ A1, . . . , γσ(N) ∈ AN ).
We have∫
P σπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
:=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN )P σπ (dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)
×
T−1∏
t=0
νt
(
dy1:Nt
∣∣ω0, x1:N0 , ζ1:N0:t−1, y1:N0:t−1, γ10(y10), . . . , γ1t−1(y1t−1), . . . , γNt−1(yNt−1))
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN )Pπ(dγ
σ(1), . . . , dγσ(N))µN (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)(B.3)
×
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
νit
(
dyit
∣∣∣ω0, xi0, ζi0:t−1, y↓↓i↓t , u↓↓i↓t
)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
σ(1), . . . , uσ(N))Pπ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (d(ζσ)1:N |ω0)P(dω0)(B.4)
×
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
νit
(
dy
σ(i)
t
∣∣∣ω0, xσ(i)0 , ζσ(i)0:t−1, y↓↓σ(i)↓t , u↓↓σ(i)↓t
)
=
∫
c(ω0, u
1, . . . , uN )Pπ(dγ
1, . . . , dγN )µN (dζ1:N |ω0)P(dω0)(B.5)
×
T−1∏
t=0
N∏
i=1
νit
(
dyit
∣∣∣ω0, xi0, ζi0:t−1, y↓↓i↓t , u↓↓i↓t
)
=
∫
Pπ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
where (B.3) follows from (b) and the definition of P σπ and (B.4) follows from relabeling
uσ(i), yσ(i), ζσ(i) with ui, yi, ζi for all i = 1, . . . , N and the fact that ui = γi(yi) and yit =
ht(x
i
0, x
−i
0 , ζ
i
0:t, ζ
−i
0:t , u
i
0:t−1, u
−i
0:t−1). Equality (B.5) follows from (a), Assumption 5.2 and
the hypothesis that the information structure is symmetric. The rest of the proof follows from
similar steps in that of Lemma 4.1.
B.3. Proof of Lemma 5.3. We follow steps of the proof of Lemma 4.2. Under Assump-
tion 5.3, Assumption 5.4, following from [63, Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 5.6], there exists a
deterministic optimal policy for (PNT ). Hence, following from Lemma 5.2, for every finite
N , there exists an optimal policy in LNEX. Consider a sequence {P
∗,N
π }N , where for every
N ≥ 1, P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX and∫
P ∗,Nπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)(B.6)
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= inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).
(Step 1): Let (I1, I2, . . . ) be i.i.d. random variables with the uniform distribution on
the set {1, . . . , N}. For a fixed N and for any P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX, we construct P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX as
follows: for every fixed N and for all Ai ∈ B(Γi)
P
∗,∞
π,N (γ
1 ∈ A1, . . . , γ2 ∈ AN ) := P ∗,Nπ (γ
I1 ∈ A1, . . . , γIN ∈ AN ),
where P
∗,∞
π,N is the restriction of P
∗,∞
π,PNpi
∈ LEX to the first N components.
Define a random variable u
∗,i
t,N = γ
i
N,t(y
i
t) where (γ
1
N,t, . . . , γ
N
N,t) for all t =
0, . . . , T − 1 are determined by P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX and under the reduction (Assumption 5.3)
on observations. Let u
∗,i
t,∞,N = γ
i
t,∞,N (y
i
t) where (γ
1
t,∞,N , . . . , γ
N
t,∞,N ) are determined
by P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX and fixed probability measures on observations and disturbances. Let
γi
N
:= (γiN,0, . . . , γ
i
N,T−1), γ
i
N,∞
:= (γi0,∞,N , . . . , γ
i
T−1,∞,N ), u
i
N := (u
i
N,0, . . . , u
i
N,T−1)
and uiN,∞ := (u
i
0,∞,N , . . . , u
i
T−1,∞,N) for each DM. Since under the reduction (Assump-
tion 5.1), observations are i.i.d. through DMs and also independent of ω0, following from
Theorem A.1, we have for everym ≥ 1
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣L(γ1N , . . . , γmN , y1, . . . , ym)− L(γ1N,∞, . . . , γmN,∞, y1, . . . , ym)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣L(γ1N , . . . , γmN )
m∏
i=1
L(yi)− L(γ1
N,∞
, . . . , γm
N,∞
)
m∏
i=1
L(yi)
∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣
TV
−−−−→
N→∞
0.(B.7)
where (A.6) follows from the fact that (γ1
N
, . . . , γN
N
) and (γ1
N,∞
, . . . , γN
N,∞
) are random
variables with joint probability measures P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX and P
∗,∞
π,N ∈ LEX
∣∣
N
, respectively.
Since U is compact and the probability measure on observation is fixed, any joint probability
measures on acttions and observations is tight, hence, {L(γi
∞,N
)}N is tight for each DM
and by exchangeablity L(γi
∞,N
) = L(γ1
∞,N
). Hence, we can find a subsequence such that
L(γi
∞,l
) −−−→
l→∞
L(γi
∞
) for all i ∈ N. Since marginals of {L(γ1
∞,l
, . . . , γm
∞,l
)}l are tight, for
eachm ≥ 1, there exists a further subsequence
L(γ1
∞,n
, . . . , γm
∞,n
) −−−−→
n→∞
L(γ1
∞
, . . . , γm
∞
),
where (γ1
∞
, γ2
∞
, . . . ) is infinitely exchangeable and induced by P ∗,∞π ∈ LEX since the set
of infinitely exchangeable random variables is closed under the weak-convergence topology
where by weak convergence of an infinite sequence, we mean weak convergence of finite
restrictions (see for example proof of Theorem 3.2 where we show that any convergent se-
quence {Pnπ }n ⊂ LEX converges to a limit Pπ ⊂ LEX, also we refer the readers to [1] for
more general results). Hence, following from (A.6), for eachm ≥ 1
L(γ1
n
, . . . , γm
n
) −−−−→
n→∞
L(γ1
∞
, . . . , γm
∞
).
By construction of random variables u∗,in = γ
i
n
(yi) and u∗,i∞ = γ
i
∞
(yi) and since random
variables γi
n
s are independent of yis, we have for eachm ≥ 1
(u∗,1n , . . . , u
∗,m
n )
d
−−−−→
n→∞
(u1∞, . . . , u
m
∞),
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where (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) is induced by an infinitely exchangeable policies P
∗,∞
π ∈ LEX. Follow-
ing from Theorem A.2, P-almost surely
Fn,t(A) := F
ω
n,t(A) :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ
u
∗,i
n,t(ω)
(A)
d
−−−−→
n→∞
α
u,ω
t (A),(B.8)
where A ∈ U and ω denotes the sample path dependence and αut is the directing random
measure of an infinitely exchangeable random variables (u1∞,t, u
2
∞,t, . . . ). By (B.8), since
the action space is compact, for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, we have P-almost surely
µun,t := µ
u,ω
n,t :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
u
∗,i
n,t =
∫
U
uFn,t(du)
d
−−−−→
n→∞
µut :=
∫
U
uα
u,ω
t (du).(B.9)
(Step 2): Let x
∗,i
t,n be the state of DM
i at time t under u
∗,i
0:t−1,n = (u
∗,i
0,n, . . . , u
∗,i
t−1,n):
x
∗,i
t+1,n = ft
(
x
∗,i
t,n, u
∗,i
n,t,
1
n
n∑
p=1
x
∗,p
n,t ,
1
n
n∑
p=1
u
∗,p
n,t, w
i
t
)
.(B.10)
Let t = 1. We have
x
∗,i
1,n = f0
(
xi0, u
∗,i
n,0,
1
n
n∑
p=1
x
p
0,
1
n
n∑
p=1
u
∗,p
n,0, w
i
0
)
.(B.11)
Since initial states are i.i.d. by continuity of the function f0 in actions and states, we have
x
∗,i
1,n
d
−−−−→
n→∞
x
∗,i
1,∞ for all DMs. Hence, (x
∗,1
n,1, . . . , x
∗,n
n,1) is relatively compact and for each
m ≥ 1, there exists a subsubsequence (x∗,1k,1, . . . , x
∗,m
k,1 )
d
−−−−→
k→∞
(x∗,1∞,1, . . . , x
∗,m
∞,1). Following
from Theorem A.2, since f0 is bounded, we have P-almost surely
µxk,1 :=
1
n
n∑
i=1
x
∗,i
k,1 = µ
x,ω
k,1 =
∫
X
xd(
1
k
k∑
i=1
δ
x
∗,i
k,1
)
d
−−−−→
k→∞
µx1 :=
∫
X
xα
x,ω
1 (dx),(B.12)
where αx1 is the directing measure for (x
∗,1
∞,1, x
∗,2
∞,1, . . . ). Similarly, we can show that for
t = 2,
x
∗,i
2,k = f1
(
x
∗,i
1,k, u
∗,i
k,1, µ
x
k,1, µ
x
k,1, w
i
1
)
.(B.13)
By continuity of the function f0 and the analysis for t = 1, we have x
∗,i
2,k
d
−−−−→
k→∞
x
∗,i
2,∞ for
all DMs. Hence, {L(x∗,1k,1, . . . , x
∗,k
k,1)}l is tight and for each m ≥ 1, there exists a further
subsubsequence (x∗,1kl,1, . . . , x
∗,m
kl,1
)
d
−−−−→
kl→∞
(x∗,1∞,1, . . . , x
∗,m
∞,1) . Following from TheoremA.2,
since f1 is bounded, , we have P-almost surely
µxkl,2 := µ
x,ω
kl,2
=
∫
X
xd(
1
kl
kl∑
i=1
δ
x
∗,i
kl,2
)
d
−−−−→
kl→∞
µx2 :=
∫
X
xα
x,ω
2 (dx),(B.14)
where αx2 is the directing measure for (x
∗,1
∞,2, x
∗,2
∞,2, . . . ). By induction, for eachm ≥ 1, there
exists a further subsubsequence n (which we indicate by n to omit further sub-subscript) such
that (x∗,1n , . . . , x
∗,m
n )
d
−−−−→
nl→∞
(x∗,1∞ , . . . , x
∗,m
∞ ) and µ
x
nl,t
d
−−−−→
n→∞
µxt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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Now, we follow the steps of Lemma 4.2, however, in addition to actions and observa-
tions, we consider states and disturbances in our analysis and we use the result of (Step 2).
Define P˜ ∗,n as the joint probability measures of (u∗,1n , x
∗,1
n , µ
u
n,0:T−1, µ
x
n,0:T−1, y, ζ). Since
marginals on (u∗,1n , x
∗,1
n , µ
u
n,0:T−1, µ
x
n,0:T−1) are tight and under the reduction marginals on
(y, ζ) are fixed, {P˜ ∗,n}n is tight. Hence, there exists a further subsubsequence {P˜ ∗,nk}nk
converges weakly to P˜ ∗ as nk goes to infinity where with a slight abuse of notations we
used nk as the index of subsequent. This implies that marginals {P˜
∗,nk}nk converge to the
marginals of P˜ ∗, hence, P˜ ∗ is induced by (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) which is infinitely exchangeable
and is induced by a policy in LEX.
(Step 3): Since the cost function is continuous in states and actions, under the reduction
(Assumption 5.3), we have P-almost surely
1
N
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
c
(
ω0, x
i
t, u
i
t,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
t ,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
t
)
×
N∏
i=1
T−1∏
t=0
φit
(
yit, ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
0:t
)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
c¯
(
ω0, ζ
i, xi, ui,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up,
1
N
N∑
p=1
xp
)
(B.15)
×
N∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, ui,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up,
1
N
N∑
p=1
xp
)
,
where (B.15) is true following from (2.3) and Assumption 5.4 for some function cˆ : Ω0×S×
X×U×U×X→ R+ which is continuous in states and actions and
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, ui,
1
N
N∑
p=1
up,
1
N
N∑
p=1
xp
)
:=
T−1∏
t=0
φit
(
yit, ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t−1, u
i
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
u
p
0:t−1,
1
N
N∑
p=1
x
p
0:t
)
We have,
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
∫ ∫
∏
∞
i=nl+1
Y×S
c¯
(
ω0, ζ
i, xi, ui, µuN,0:T−1, µ
x
N,0:T−1
)
(B.16)
×P˜ ∗,N(du∗,i, dx∗,i, dµuN,0:T−1, dµ
x
N,0:T−1, y, ζ)
×
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, u∗,i, µuN,0:T−1, µ
x
N,0:T−1
)
P(dω0)
≥ lim
nk→∞
∫ ∫
∏
∞
i=nk+1
Y×S
c¯
(
ω0, ζ
1, x1, u1, µunk,0:T−1, µ
x
nk,0:T−1
)
(B.17)
×P˜ ∗,nk(du∗,i, dx∗,i, dµunk,0:T−1, dµ
x
nk,0:T−1, y, ζ)
×
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, u∗,i, µunk,0:T−1, µ
x
nk,0:T−1
)
P(dω0)
=
∫
c¯
(
ω0, ζ
1, x1, u1, µu0:T−1, µ
x
0:T−1
)
(B.18)
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×P˜ ∗(du∗,i, dx∗,i, dµu0:T−1, dµ
x
0:T−1, y, ζ)P(dω0)
×
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, u∗,i, µu0:T−1, µ
x
0:T−1
)
P(dω0)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
inf
Ppi∈LEX
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).(B.19)
where (B.16) follows from integrating over the set (
∏∞
i=nl+1
Y × S) and the fact that under
the reduction, observations and disturbances, initial states are i.i.d. and (u∗,1N , . . . , u
∗,N
N )
is N -exchangeable. Inequality (B.17) follows from the assumption that the cost func-
tion is bounded and limsup is the greatest subsequence limit of a bounded sequence.
Equality (B.18) follows from the dominated convergence theorem and following from
Assumption 5.4 and Assumption 5.3 and since probability measures on observations
disturbances are fixed and since by (Step 2) {P˜ ∗,nk}nk converges weakly to P˜
∗ and∏∞
i=1 φ
i(yi, ω0, ζ
i, u∗,i, µunk,0:T−1, µ
x
nk,0:T−1
) converges weakly to the limit in the product
topology as nk goes to infinity. Inequality (B.19) follows from the fact that P˜
∗ is the joint
measure with the first coordinate (u1∞, u
2
∞, . . . ) which is infinitely exchangeable and is in-
duced by a policy in LEX. The above inequalities are equalities since the opposite direction is
true (that is because LEX
∣∣
N
⊂ LNEX) and this completes the proof.
B.4. Proof of Theorem 5.4. We complete the proof in five steps where the steps are
similar to the proof of Theorem 4.3.
(Step 1): Under Assumption 5.4 and Assumption 5.3 using [63, Theorem 5.1 and The-
orem 5.6], there exists a deterministic optimal policy for (PNT ). Hence, by Lemma 5.2, for
every finite N , there exists an optimal policy in LNEX. Consider a sequence {P
∗,N
π }N , where
for everyN ≥ 1, P ∗,Nπ ∈ L
N
EX and∫
P ∗,Nπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)(B.20)
= inf
PNpi ∈L
N
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).
(Step 2): Similar to (Step 2) of the proof of Theorem 4.3 using Lemma 5.3 and Theorem
3.2, we can show that to complete the proof, it is sufficient to show
lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)min {M, c
N(ζ, γ, y, ω0)}ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)
(B.21)
≥ inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0).
In the next two steps, we justify (B.21) through showing that there exists a subsequence
of policies induced by symmetric/identical private randomization whose weak subsequent
limit achieves the right hand side of (B.21).
(Step 3): Consider the set of probability measures of N -DM teams of LNPR,SYM. We
note that under a symmetric information structure and since each DM applies an identical
policy, yi are conditioned on ω0 i.i.d. through DMs. Hence, following from the information
structure, the policy spaces of each DM is separated from the policies of the other decision
makers. Hence, we can equivalently represent any privately randomized policy for each DM
acting through time separately as a probability measures induced by symmetric (identical
randomized policies), i.e., probability measures on (U ×Y) where policies of each DM for
every t = 0, . . . , T − 1 satisfy∫
g(ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t)P (dy
i
0:t, du
i
0:t|ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1)
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=∫
g(ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t)
t∏
k=0
ΠNk (du
i
k|y
i
k)ηk(dy
i
k|ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:k−1, y
i
0:k−1, u
i
0:k−1),
for all bounded functions g which is continuous in actions and observations and measurable
in other arguments and for some stochastic kernel ΠNk representing a randomized policy of
DMs at time k (which is identical through DMs). Under the reduction (assumption 5.1).
Since U is compact, the marginals on U is relatively compact under the weak conver-
gence topology. Hence, the collection of all probability measures with these relatively com-
pact marginals are also relatively compact (see e.g., [62, Proof of Theorem 2.4]). Since every
DM applies an identical policy and since observations are conditionally i.i.d., the policies as a
countably infinite product of space of policies of each DM is relatively compact (where each
coordinate is relatively compact in the weak convergence topology). Hence, this implies that
there exists a subsequence of policies P˜n ∈ P(
∏
i(Y ×U)) converges weakly (each coor-
dinate converges weakly) to a limit P˜ (as an infinite product of policies of DMs) P-almost
surely, where n is the index of the subsequence and n goes to infinity.
Assume Pn (induced by randomized policy Π
n
t for each DM at time t) is a policy for
DMi induced by an identical randomized policy converging weakly to P . Now, we show
that Assumption 5.3 leads to the closedness of the set of policies for each DM acting through
times t = 0, . . . , T − 1, i.e., the limit policy of P for every t = 0, . . . , T − 1 satisfies
∫
g(ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t)P (dω0, dx
i
0, dζ
i
0:t−1, dy
i
0:t, du
i
0:t)
=
∫
g(ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i
0:t)µ
i(dxi0, dζ
i
0:t−1|ω0)(B.22)
×
t∏
k=0
Π∞k (du
i
k|y
i
k)ηk(dy
i
k|ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:k−1, y
i
0:k−1, u
i
0:k−1),
for all bounded functions g which is continuous in actions and observations and measurable
in other arguments, and for some stochastic kernel Π∞k from Y to U for each DM. Also, µ
i is
a fixed probability measure on initial states and disturbances of DMi conditioned on ω0.
If Assumption 5.1(i) (under the structure 5.3) holds, then there exists an independent
static reduction for each DM through time, hence, following from the discussion in the proof
of [63, Theorem 5.2], each coordinate of policy spaces corresponds to DMi at time t is closed
under the weak convergence topology, and this implies that the set of policies for each DM
acting through times, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, is closed under w-s topology. Also, if Assumption
5.1(ii) (under the structure 5.3) holds, then [63, Theorem 5.6] leads to the same conclusion.
Hence, each coordinate of space of policies (corresponds to DMi) is closed under the weak
convergence topology (since each coordinate of the space of policies is a finite product of
space of policies for each DM at time instances t = 0, . . . , T − 1).
Hence, this implies that for P˜ ∗N ∈ P(
∏N
i=1(Y × U)) induced by optimal randomized
policies Π∗,Nt for each DM at time t, there exists a subsequence P˜
∗
n ∈ P(
∏∞
i=1(Y×U)) (as
an infinite product of policies of DMs Π∗,nt ) converges weakly (each coordinate converges
weakly) to a limit P˜ ∗ which is in LPR,SYM and it is induced by a randomized policy Π
∗,∞
t for
each DM at time t.
(Step 4): Let {P ∗N}N be a policy for each DM induced by optimal randomized policies
for N -DM team problems where u
i,∗
N := (u
i,∗
N,0, . . . , u
i,∗
N,T−1) is the action of DM
i through
time induced by Π∗,Nt . Following from (Step 3), there exists a weak subsequential limit
P ∗ of {P ∗n}n as n → ∞ for each DM which is induced by Π
∗,∞
t . We denote u
i,∗
∞ :=
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(ui,∗∞,0, . . . , u
i,∗
∞,T−1) as the action of DM
i induced by Π∗,∞t . Define
(B.23) ΥN (B) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δ(xi
N
,α˜i
N
)(B),
where α˜iN = (u
i,∗
N , y
i, ζi), B ∈ X × Z := X × U × Y × S, U := (
∏T−1
t=0 U), Y :=
(
∏T−1
t=0 Y), S := (
∏T−1
t=0 S) = X × (
∏T−1
t=0 W× V), X = (
∏T−1
t=0 X), y
i = (yi0, . . . , y
i
T−1),
ζi := (ζi0, . . . , ζ
i
T−1), and x
i
N = (x
i
0, . . . , x
i
T−1) with states are driven by a sequence of
N -DM randomized optimal policies of Π∗,Nt . In the following, we show that, conditioned on
ω0, the subsequence of empirical measures {Υn}n converges to Υ := L((x1∞, α˜
1
∞)|ω0) in
w-s topology where α˜i∞ = (u
∗,i
∞ , y
i, ζi) and xi∞ denotes that states of DM
i driven by u∗,i∞
which is induced by a policy P ∗ (the convergence is weakly, but since ζis are exogenous with
a fixed marginal, the convergence is also in the w-s topology).
Define
(B.24) Q¯N (B) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
δα˜i
N
(B),
where B ∈ Z . Under the reduction (Assumption 5.1) through DMs, conditioned on ω0,
observations of each DM is independent of actions and observations of other DMs for all
time instance t = 0, . . . , T −1, hence, following from a similar argument to show (A.31), the
subsequence of empirical measures {Q¯n}n∈I converges P-almost surely to Q¯ = L(α˜i∞|ω0)
in w-s topology.
Define
(B.25) Υtn(A) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
δ(xit,n,α˜it,n)(A),
where α˜it,n = (u
i,∗
n,t, y
i
t, ζ
i
t), A ∈ X × U× Y× S. Since conditioned on ω0, initial states are
i.i.d, the empirical measure of initial states converges weakly to L(x10|ω0) P-almost surely.
Since {Q¯n}n converges P-almost surely to Q¯ in w-s topology, we can conclude that Υ
0
N
converges Υ0 := L((xi0, α˜
i
0,∞)|ω0) in w-s topology P-almost surely. Following from (2.3),
for t = 0, we have for all g ∈ Cb(X), conditioned on ω0, P-almost surely
lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
g(xi1,n)= lim
n→∞
1
n
n∑
i=1
g
(
f0
(
xi0, u
∗,i
n,0,
1
n
n∑
p=1
x
p
0,
1
n
n∑
p=1
u
∗,p
n,0, w
i
0
))
= lim
n→∞
∫
g
(
f0
(
x, u,
∫
xΥ0n(dx× U× Y× S),
∫
uΥ0n(X× du× Y× S), ζ
))
(B.26)
×Υ0n(dx, du, dy, dζ)
=
∫
g
(
f0
(
x, u,
∫
xΥ0(dx× U× Y× S),
∫
uΥ0(X× du× Y× S), ζ
))
(B.27)
×Υ0(dx, du, dy, dζ)
where (B.26) follows from (B.25) and (B.27) follows from the generalized convergence the-
orem for varying measures since g is continuous and bounded and bounded function f0 is
continuous in actions and observations and measurable in uncertainties and the fact that under
the reduction, conditioned on ω0, Υ
0
N converges Υ
0 := L((xi0, α˜
i
0,∞)|ω0) in w-s topology
P-almost surely. Hence, since {Q¯n}n convergesP-almost surely to Q¯ in w-s topology condi-
tioned on ω0,Υ
1
N convergesΥ
1 := L((xi1,∞, α˜
i
1,∞)|ω0) inw-s topologyP-almost surely. By
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induction, one can show that conditioned on ω0, Υ
t
N converges Υ
t := L((xit,∞, α˜
i
t,∞)|ω0)
in w-s topology P-almost surely for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Hence, conditioned on ω0, {Υn}n∈I
converges to Υ := L((xi∞, α˜
i
∞)|ω0) in w-s topology.
(Step 5): By Assumption 5.4, similar to the proof of Theorem 5.3, we have (B.15). Un-
der the reduction, we can consider policy spaces for each DM individually. Let for every
t = 0, . . . , T − 1, P ∗,ω0n be a probability measure on actions, observations and uncertainties
induced by optimal randomized policies for each DM (which is identical because of symme-
try) forN -DM teams conditioned on ω0, i.e., a probability measure that satisfies
∫
g(ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i,∗
n,0:t)P
∗,ω0
n (dx
i
0, dζ
i
0:t−1, dy
i
0:t, du
i,∗
n,0:t|ω0)
=
∫
g(ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:t−1, y
i
0:t, u
i,∗
n,0:t)µ
i(dxi0, dζ
i
0:t−1|ω0)(B.28)
×
t∏
k=0
Π∗,nk (du
∗,i
n,k|y
i
k)ηk(dy
i
k|ω0, x
i
0, ζ
i
0:k−1, y
i
0:k−1, u
i,∗
n,0:k−1),
for all bounded functions g which is continuous in actions and observations and measurable
in other arguments. Similarly, we denote P ∗,ω0 as a probability measure induced by the limit
policy, i.e., a probability measure satisfying (B.28) induced by Π∗,∞k . Hence, following from
a similar argument as in the (Step 4) of the proof of Theorem 5.4, we have
lim
M→∞
lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0)min {M, c
N(ζ, γ, y, ω0)}
≥ lim
M→∞
lim
n→∞
∫ ∫
min
{
M,c¯
(
ω0, ζ, x, u,
∫
uΥn(X× du×Y × S),
∫
xΥn(dx×U×Y × S)
)}(B.29)
×Υn(dx, du, dy, dζ)
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0n (du
i,∗
n , dy
i, dζi)
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, ui,∗n ,
1
n
n∑
p=1
up,∗n ,
1
n
n∑
p=1
xpn
)
P(dω0)
= lim
M→∞
∫
lim
n→∞
∫
min
{
M,c¯
(
ω0, ζ, x, u,
∫
uΥn(X× du×Y × S),
∫
xΥn(dx×U×Y × S)
)}(B.30)
×Υn(dx, du, dy, dζ)
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0n (du
i,∗
n , dy
i, dζi)
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, ui,∗n ,
1
n
n∑
p=1
up,∗n ,
1
n
n∑
p=1
xpn
)
P(dω0)
= lim
M→∞
∫ ∫
min
{
M,c¯
(
ω0, ζ, x, u,
∫
uΥ(X× du ×Y × S),
∫
xΥ(dx×U×Y × S)
)}(B.31)
×Υ(dx, du, dy, dζ)
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0(dui,∗∞ , dy
i, dζi)
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, ui,∗∞ ,E[u
1,∗
∞ |ω0],E[x
1
∞|ω0]
)
P(dω0)
=
∫ ∫
c¯
(
ω0, ζ, x, u,
∫
uΥ(X× du×Y × S),
∫
xΥ(dx×U×Y × S)
)(B.32)
×Υ(dx, du, dy, dζ)
∞∏
i=1
P ∗,ω0(dui,∗∞ , dy
i, dζi)
∞∏
i=1
φi
(
yi, ω0, ζ
i, ui,∗∞ ,E[u
1,∗
∞ |ω0],E[x
1
∞|ω0]
)
P(dω0)
≥ inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→N
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dζ)c
N (ζ, γ, y, ω0)ν(dy|ζ, γ, ω0),
where (B.29) follows from (B.23) and (B.15) and since limsup is the greatest convergent sub-
sequence limit for a bounded sequence, and (B.30) follows from the dominated convergence
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theorem. Following from a similar argument as the analysis in (Step 4) of the proof of The-
orem 4.3, since {Υn}n∈I converges weakly to Υ P-almost surely, an argument based on the
generalized convergence theorem for varying measures in [56, Theorem 3.5] implies (B.31),
and (B.32) follows from the monotone convergence theorem. Hence, (B.21) holds and this
completes the proof.
Appendix C. Proofs from Section 6.
C.1. Proof of Theorem 6.1.
(i) We first show (6.1). We have
inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≥ inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N∩LEX
∣∣
N
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)− ǫN(C.1)
= inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)− ǫN ,(C.2)
whereLEX
∣∣
N
denotes the set ofN -DM policies which are the restrictions of policies inLEX to
the N first components (this set of probability measures is also called “infinitely extendable”
in the probability theory literature). By Lemma 4.1 since L¯N is convex, without losing global
optimality, we can optimize over L¯N ∩LNEX. Let ǫ > 0, and consider P
∗,N
π,ǫ ∈ L¯
N ∩LNEX such
that
inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N∩LN
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≥
∫
P ∗,Nπ,ǫ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)− ǫ.(C.3)
Following from the proof of Lemma 4.2, using P ∗,Nπ,ǫ ∈ L¯
N ∩LNEX and by considering the in-
dexes as a sequence of i.i.d. randomvariables with uniformdistribution on the set {1, . . . , N},
we can construct an infinitely exchangeable policy P ∗,∞π,ǫ where the restriction of an infinitely
exchangeable policy to N first components P
∗,∞
π,N,ǫ ∈ L¯
N ∩ LEX
∣∣
N
, satisfies
∫
P
∗,∞
π,N,ǫ(dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
=
∫
P ∗,Nπ,ǫ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫN .(C.4)
Hence, (C.3) and (C.4) imply that
inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N∩LN
EX
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≥ inf
PNpi ∈L¯
N∩LEX
∣∣
N
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)− ǫ− ǫN .
Since ǫ is arbitrary, this implies (C.1). Since LNCO ⊆ L¯
N , by Theorem 3.2, without losing
optimality, we can optimize overLNCO,SYM. Equality (C.2) is true sinceL
N
CO,SYM is convexwith
extreme points in LNPR,SYM, and the map
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) : L
N
CO,SYM → R
is linear.
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Now, we show (6.2) holds. We have
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)(C.5)
≥ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR, SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)− ǫN ,(C.6)
where (C.5) follows from Blackwell’s irrelevant information theorem [9] and since LNCO is
convexwith extreme points inLNPR and themap
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) : L
N
CO →
R is linear, hence, without losing optimality, we can optimaize over LNCO. Inequality (C.6)
follows from (6.1) by considering L¯N = LNCO (since L
N
CO is convex) and this completes the
proof of (i).
(ii) Let P ∗π ∈ LPR,SYM be an optimal policy of (P∞) and P
∗
π,N is the restriction of P
∗
π to
the first N components. Define for all N ∈ N
aN :=
∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
bN := inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).
Following from (Step 4) of the proof of Theorem 4.3, since the cost function is bounded,
lim sup
N→∞
∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
:= inf
Ppi∈LPR,SYM
lim sup
N→∞
∫
Pπ,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
= lim sup
N→∞
inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0).(C.7)
Hence, lim sup
N→∞
aN = lim sup
N→∞
bN . Following from (Step 4) of the proof of Theorem 4.3, and
symmetry, lim
N→∞
aN = a < ∞ and also there exists a subsequence such that lim
k→∞
bNk =
a < ∞. On the other hand, since aN ≥ bN for all N ∈ N, we can find ǫ¯N ≥ 0 such that
aN = bN + ǫ¯N . Taking limit as k goes to infinity from both sides, we have
a = lim
k→∞
(bNk + ǫNk) = a+ lim
k→∞
ǫNk .
Hence, lim
k→∞
ǫNk = 0 since ǫ¯N ≥ 0. Hence, there exists ǫ¯N ≥ 0 where for some subse-
quences ǫ¯N → 0 as N goes to infinity such that∫
P ∗π,N (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0)
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PR,SYM
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫ¯N
≤ inf
PNpi ∈L
N
PA
∫
PNπ (dγ)µ
N (dω0, dy)c
N (γ, y, ω0) + ǫN + ǫ¯N(C.8)
where (C.8) follows from (6.2), and this completes the proof of (ii).
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